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Taxes

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Economic structure

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We propose and implement a new test of the dividend signaling hypothesis that is designed to discriminate between dividend signaling and other theories that would account for the apparent existence of a dividend preference. Our test refines the use of data on stock price responses to dividend announcements. In particular, we study the effect of dividend taxation on the bang-for-the-buck, which we define as the share price response per dollar of dividends. Most dividend signaling models imply that an increase in dividend taxation should increase the bang-for-the-buck. In contrast, other dividend preference theories imply that an increase in dividend taxation should decrease the bang-for-the-buck. Since there have recently been considerable variation in the tax treatment of dividends, we are able to study dividend announcement effects under different tax regimes. Our central finding is that there is a strong positive relationship between dividend tax rates and the bang-for-the-buck. This result supports the dividend signaling hypothesis, and is consistent with alternatives. The paper also provides corroborating evidence based on the relationship between the bang-for-the-buck and bond ratings.

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The evidence presented in this paper supports the view that many Americans, particularly those without a college education, save too little. Our analysis also indicates that it should be possible to increase total personal saving among lower income households by encouraging the formation and expansion of private pension plans. It is doubtful that favorable tax treatment of capital income would stimulate significant additional saving by this group. Conversely, the expansion of private pensions would probably have little effect on saving by higher income households. However, these households are more likely to increase saving significantly in response to favorable tax treatment of capital income. Currently, eligibility for IRAs is linked to an AGI cap, and pension coverage is more common among higher income households than among low income households. The most effective system for promoting personal saving would have precisely the opposite features. Extending tax incentives for saving to higher income households is problematic. We discuss three competing policy options, IRAs with AGI caps, the universal IRA, and the Premium Saving Account (PSA). Our analysis reveals that the PSA system is a more cost-effective vehicle for providing saving incentives to, all households, particularly those in the top quintile of the income distribution.