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Armies --- Command of troops --- Communications, Military --- Military intelligence --- Staffs --- History --- 1800-1999

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In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

Vietnam War, 1961-1975 --- Tet Offensive, 1968. --- Vietnam Conflict, 1961-1975 --- Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 --- Vietnamese War, 1961-1975 --- Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968 --- Military intelligence. --- Campaigns --- Tet Offensive, 1968 --- 842.1 Propaganda --- 850 Vrede- en conflictstudies --- 855.4 Militaire interventies --- 876.1 Defensie --- 876.2 Inlichtingendienst --- 876 Veiligheidspolitiek --- 882.4 Noord-Amerika --- 883.3 Zuidoost-Azië --- 883 Azië --- Military intelligence