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Description Contents Resources Courses About the AuthorsAccording to the doctrine of odious debt, loans which are knowingly provided to subjugate or defraud the population of a debtor state are not legally binding against that state under international law. Breaking with widespread scepticism, this groundbreaking book reaffirms the original doctrine through a meticulous and definitive examination of state practice and legal history. It restates the doctrine by introducing a new classification of odious debts and defines 'odiousness' by reference to the current, much more determinate and litigated framework of existing public international law. Acknowledging that much of sovereign debt is now governed by the private law of New York and England, Jeff King explores how 'odious debts' in international law should also be regarded as contrary to public policy in private law. This book is essential reading for practising lawyers, scholars, and development and human rights workers.

Debts, External --- Debts, Public --- Debt relief. --- International law. --- Law of nations --- Nations, Law of --- Public international law --- Law --- Debt relief --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Debtor and creditor --- Law and legislation. --- Law and legislation --- International law --- Odious debt.

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The insolvency of sovereign debtors is a virtually timeless phenomenon and yet the existing international financial architecture does not provide any legal framework to deal with this issue. Following an overview of the main proposals as to how to bridge this gap, this study analyses the extent to which public international law can be used as a source for the establishment of a reorganisation system for sovereign debt. While there is no adequate customary international law relating to sovereign insolvencies, reference can instead be made to the growing body of general principles of law. This is illustrated by a comparison of the systems of corporate financial reorganisation in insolvency in six representatively selected countries - Argentina, England, France, Germany, Indonesia and the U.S. Due to the inherent lack of enforceability with regard to sovereign debtors, in order to be able to provide a basis for a reorganisation system for sovereign debt, these principles need to be complemented with a compliance control mechanism. This study suggests how such a system could be constructed and implemented.

Debts, Public --- Debt relief. --- State bankruptcy. --- Finance, Public --- Dettes publiques --- Dettes --- Faillite d'Etat --- Finances publiques --- Law and legislation. --- Law and legislation --- Droit --- Allègement --- Debt relief --- State bankruptcy --- Bankruptcy, National --- National bankruptcy --- Bankruptcy --- International law --- Repudiation --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Debtor and creditor

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Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same external debt-to-GDP ratio. These countries actually have repeated defaults or restructurings in short periods. This paper explains these stylized facts within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults. The model also accords with an additional fact: lower recovery rates (high NPV haircuts) are associated with increases in spreads at renegotiation.

Debts, Public --- Debt relief --- Debts, Government --- Government debts --- National debts --- Public debt --- Public debts --- Sovereign debt --- Debt --- Bonds --- Deficit financing --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Debtor and creditor --- Econometric models --- Law and legislation --- E-books --- Financial Risk Management --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Public Finance --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Open Economy Macroeconomics --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Price Level --- Inflation --- Deflation --- Finance --- Monetary economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Credit --- Asset prices --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Asset and liability management --- Money --- Prices --- Debts, External --- Argentina

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This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

Finance --- Business & Economics --- International Finance --- Debt relief. --- Debtor and creditor. --- Creditor --- Debtor and creditor --- Debt relief --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Law and legislation --- Commercial law --- Contracts --- Obligations (Law) --- Credit --- Creditors' bills --- Fraudulent conveyances --- Liens --- Payment --- Security (Law) --- Debts, External --- E-books --- Financial Risk Management --- Investments: Bonds --- Public Finance --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Crises --- Investment & securities --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Public finance & taxation --- Bonds --- Financial crises --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Public debt --- Asset and liability management --- Financial institutions --- Debts, Public --- Argentina

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The paper offers a method to quantify benefits and costs of corporate debt restructuring, with an application to Korea. We suggest a "persistent ICR<1" criterion to capture firms that had ICR<1 for multiple consecutive years and thus will likely require restructuring. We assess the benefits of debt restructuring by estimating the effects of removing a firm's debt overhang on its investment and hiring decisions. We refine the assumptions on the cost of debt restructuring based on the literature, and focus not only on creditor losses, but also on the employment impact of corporate restructuring. Benchmark results for Korea suggest 5.5-7.5 percent of GDP creditor losses and a 0.4-0.9 percent of the labor force employment impact from the debt restructuring. These are compensated by a permanent 0.4-0.9 percentage points increase in future GDP growth thanks to higher corporate investment and 0.05-0.1 percent of labor force higher hiring in the subsequent years. The key qualitative result is that corporate debt restructurings "pay off" in the medium term: their economic cost is recouped over about 10 years.

Corporate debt --- Debt relief --- Econometric models --- E-books --- Econometric models. --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Debtor and creditor --- Corporations --- Debt --- Debt financing (Corporations) --- Law and legislation --- Finance --- Exports and Imports --- Financial Risk Management --- Labor --- Industries: Manufacturing --- Investment --- Capital --- Intangible Capital --- Capacity --- Business Fluctuations --- Cycles --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Industry Studies: Manufacturing: General --- Labour --- income economics --- International economics --- Manufacturing industries --- Labor force --- Debt burden --- Manufacturing --- Asset and liability management --- External debt --- Economic sectors --- Debts, External --- Economic theory --- Labor market --- Korea, Republic of --- Income economics