Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Economists warn that policies to level the economic playing field come with a hefty price tag. But this so-called 'equality-efficiency trade-off' has proven difficult to document. The data suggest, instead, that the extraordinary levels of economic inequality now experienced in many economies are detrimental to the economy. Moreover, recent economic experiments and other evidence confirm that most citizens are committed to fairness and are willing to sacrifice to help those less fortunate than themselves. Incorporating the latest results from behavioral economics and the new microeconomics of credit and labor markets, Bowles shows that escalating economic disparity is not the unavoidable price of progress. Rather it is policy choice - often a very costly one. Here drawing on his experience both as a policy advisor and an academic economist, he offers an alternative direction, a novel and optimistic account of a more just and better working economy.

Business, Economy and Management --- Economics --- Income distribution. --- Fairness. --- Impartiality --- Conduct of life --- Justice --- Distribution of income --- Income inequality --- Inequality of income --- Distribution (Economic theory) --- Disposable income --- Income distribution --- Fairness --- E-books --- Business and economics --- Microeconomics

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. In "A Cooperative Species", Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis - pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior - show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, "A Cooperative Species" provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative

Cooperation --- Cooperativeness --- Behavior evolution --- Moraal en ethiek (algemeenheden). --- Behavior evolution. --- 170 --- 201 --- AA / International- internationaal --- 316 --- Cooperation (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Collaborative economy --- Cooperative distribution --- Cooperative movement --- Distribution, Cooperative --- Peer-to-peer economy --- Sharing economy --- Economics --- Profit-sharing --- Behavioral evolution --- Evolutionary psychology --- 316 Sociologie --(algemeen) --- Sociologie --(algemeen) --- Moraal en ethiek (algemeenheden) --- Sociologie: algemeenheden --- Economic order --- Cooperation. --- Cooperativeness.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis--pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior--show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, A Cooperative Species provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.

Cooperation. --- Cooperativeness. --- Behavior evolution. --- Behavioral evolution --- Cooperation (Psychology) --- Collaborative economy --- Cooperative distribution --- Cooperative movement --- Distribution, Cooperative --- Peer-to-peer economy --- Sharing economy --- Evolutionary psychology --- Social psychology --- Economics --- Profit-sharing --- Cooperation --- Cooperativeness --- Behavior evolution --- E-books --- Australia. --- altruism. --- altruistic cooperation. --- altruistic punishment. --- ancestral humans. --- behavior. --- beliefs. --- coevolution. --- common good. --- constraints. --- coordinated punishment. --- correlated equilibrium. --- costly signaling. --- cultural transmission. --- culture. --- early humans. --- equilibrium selection. --- ethical norms. --- evolution. --- evolutionary dynamics. --- fitness-reducing norm. --- fitness. --- folk theorem. --- foragers. --- free-riders. --- free-riding. --- gene-culture coevolution. --- genetic differentiation. --- genetic inheritance. --- group competition. --- group membership. --- guilt. --- helping behavior. --- hostility. --- human cooperation. --- hunter-gatherer society. --- inclusive fitness. --- indirect reciprocity. --- institutions. --- intergroup conflict. --- internalization. --- multi-level selection. --- norms. --- parochial altruism. --- parochialism. --- peer pressure. --- phenotypic expression. --- positive assortment. --- preferences. --- prehistoric human society. --- private information. --- prosocial behavior. --- public goods game. --- public information. --- punishment. --- reciprocal altruism. --- repeated game. --- reproductive leveling. --- sacrifice. --- selective extinction. --- self-interest. --- shame. --- social behavior. --- social dilemmas. --- social emotions. --- social institutions. --- social interactions. --- social norms. --- social order. --- social preferences. --- socialization. --- sociobiology. --- strong reciprocity. --- within-group segmentation.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

#A9201E --- Economic schools --- Radical economics. --- Marxian economics

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The market does not spontaneously generate democratic or participatory economic institutions. This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market-mediated interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear on a range of related issues, including the relationship between democratic firms and efficiency in market economies; incentives and the relative merits of various forms of internal democratic decision-making; and the effects of democratically accountable firms on innovation, saving, investment, and on the informational and disciplinary aspects of markets. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction (game theory, transactions' cost analysis, social choice theory, rent-seeking, etc.) are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.

Economic policy. --- 338.22 --- Economic policy --- Economic nationalism --- Economic planning --- National planning --- State planning --- Economics --- Planning --- National security --- Social policy --- Economische organisatieleer. Economisch beleid. Economische politiek --- 338.22 Economische organisatieleer. Economisch beleid. Economische politiek --- Social Sciences --- Political Science