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Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multicountry, multicultural, and multilingual context involving multiple central banking traditions. How does this heterogeneity affect the ability of economic agents to understand and to anticipate monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB)? Using a database of surveys of professional ECB policy forecasters in 24 countries, we find remarkable differences in forecast accuracy, and show that they are partly related to geography and clustering around informational hubs, as well as to country-specific economic conditions and traditions of independent central banking in the past. In large part, this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting models. While some systematic differences between analysts have been transitional and are indicative of learning, others are more persistent.
Electronic books. -- local. --- European Union countries -- Economic policy. --- Monetary policy -- European Union countries. --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Money --- Monetary policy --- European Union countries --- Economic policy. --- Banks and Banking --- Inflation --- Industries: General --- Labor --- Monetary Policy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Information and Market Efficiency --- Event Studies --- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Macroeconomics: Production --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Banking --- Macroeconomics --- Labour --- income economics --- Central bank policy rate --- Central bank autonomy --- Industrial production --- Financial services --- Central banks --- Prices --- Production --- Unemployment --- Interest rates --- Banks and banking --- Industries --- United Kingdom --- Income economics
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Which Federal Reserve Bank presidents vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: nonvoting presidents do attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. We test two hypotheses about the dependence of presidents' behavior on voting status. (i) Loss compensation: presidents compensate the loss of the right to vote with an increased use of speeches and contributions. (ii) Motivation: presidents complement the right to vote with an increased use of speeches and contributions. The evidence favors the motivation hypothesis. Also, in years that presidents vote, their speeches move financial markets less than in years they do not vote. We argue that this vote discount is consistent with presidents’ communication behavior.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Labor --- Inflation --- Industries: Financial Services --- Social Choice --- Clubs --- Committees --- Associations --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Fiscal Policy --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Labour --- income economics --- Unemployment --- Unemployment rate --- Prices --- Financial sector --- Economic sectors --- Asset prices --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Financial services industry --- Income economics
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