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ISBN: 1462348017 1455216178 Year: 1994 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,
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Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker, and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on data for the interest rate differential between France and Germany and find support for our hypothesis.
Deflation --- Foreign Exchange --- Income economics --- Inflation --- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects --- Labor --- Labour --- Macroeconomics --- Policy Coordination --- Policy Designs and Consistency --- Policy Objectives --- Price Level --- Prices --- Unemployment rate --- Unemployment --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Germany
Book
ISBN: 1462363997 1452757267 1282110136 1451903146 9786613803023 1451857969 Year: 2004 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,
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We use the concepts of deliberative democracy from political science and cheap talk from economics to develop a better understanding of how public discussion can contribute to building and demonstrating ownership of IMF programs and hence to program success. We argue that ownership is more complex than many discussions of it would suggest, since it must include not only the willingness to carry out a program, but also the technical capacity and especially the political ability to do so. Public discussion can serve a number of purposes, each of which can be better understood by moving to a more formal treatment. We illustrate our points by means of simple examples. We also consider some of the drawbacks of public discussion, especially as applied to IMF programs.
Economic development projects --- Political participation. --- Citizen participation --- Community action --- Community involvement --- Community participation --- Involvement, Community --- Mass political behavior --- Participation, Citizen --- Participation, Community --- Participation, Political --- Political activity --- Political behavior --- Political rights --- Social participation --- Political activists --- Politics, Practical --- Development projects, Economic --- Projects, Economic development --- Economic assistance --- Technical assistance --- Citizen participation. --- Public opinion. --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Taxation --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Conflict --- Conflict Resolution --- Alliances --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Fiscal Policy --- Labor Economics: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Labour --- income economics --- Tax incentives --- Expenditure --- Fiscal consolidation --- Labor --- Fiscal policy --- Communications in revenue administration --- Revenue administration --- Expenditures, Public --- Labor economics --- Revenue --- Senegal --- Income economics
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