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This book describes in a game-theoretical approach how the development success story Vietnam managed to keep rent seeking in check sufficiently to attract record numbers of foreign investors and exhibit strong economic growth in the early stages of its economic reforms. It concludes that pluralistic contestation among societal interests under conditions of factor mobility can lead to the same benefits that are generally associated with liberal democracy-commitment to limited government through checks and balances.
Decentralization in government --- Economic development --- Investments, Foreign --- Rent seeking --- Economic aspects --- Vietnam --- Economic policy --- Development, Economic --- Economic growth --- Growth, Economic --- Centralization in government --- Devolution in government --- Government centralization --- Government decentralization --- Government devolution --- Rent (Economic theory) --- Economics --- Statics and dynamics (Social sciences) --- Development economics --- Resource curse --- Political science --- Central-local government relations --- Federal government --- Local government --- Public administration --- E-books
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This book presents essential elements for understanding, interpreting, and conducting cost benefit analysis (CBA) in the context of local government. The cost benefit technique is so often referenced in government policy that a correct understanding is necessary for officials entrusted with public decisions. It is especially useful for those charged with preparing numerical analyses to assess the worthiness of a specific policy proposal. In this manual, costs and benefits are identified and analyzed in terms of economic efficiency and resource allocation.
Public works --- Cost effectiveness. --- cost benefit analysis (CBA) --- local government --- project evaluation --- discount rate --- willingness to accept --- willingness to pay --- economic efficiency --- positive time preference --- net discounted benefits --- present value of costs --- present value of benefits --- social welfare functions --- externalities/spillovers --- cost effectiveness analysis --- benefits ratio --- sensitivity analysis --- market failure --- government failure --- standing --- external/social costs --- external/social benefits --- existence values --- hedonic valuation --- hypothetical contingent valuation --- rent seeking --- regulatory capture
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A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.
Banks and banking, Central. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Monetary policy. --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Banking --- Monetary management --- Banker's banks --- Banks, Central --- Central banking --- Central banks --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Banks and banking --- Banks and Banking --- Inflation --- Macroeconomics --- Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models --- Spatial Models --- Treatment Effect Models --- Noncooperative Games --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions --- Central bank autonomy --- Personal income --- Prices --- National accounts --- Income --- South Africa
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In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.
Competition. --- Corruption. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Social Welfare & Social Work --- Social Sciences --- Criminology, Penology & Juvenile Delinquency --- Competition --- Competition (Economics) --- Competitiveness (Economics) --- Economic competition --- Corrupt practices --- Economic aspects --- Commerce --- Conglomerate corporations --- Covenants not to compete --- Industrial concentration --- Monopolies --- Open price system --- Supply and demand --- Trusts, Industrial --- Ethics --- Finance: General --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Social Choice --- Clubs --- Committees --- Associations --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Finance --- Public finance & taxation --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Tax incentives --- Financial markets --- Crime --- United Kingdom --- White-collar crime
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This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.
Corruption -- Developing countries -- Prevention -- Econometric models. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Rent (Economic theory) -- Econometric models. --- Transparency in government -- Econometric models. --- Law, Politics & Government --- Human Rights --- Corruption --- Rent (Economic theory) --- Transparency in government --- Prevention --- Econometric models. --- Economic rent --- Ground-rent --- Government in the sunshine --- Openness in government --- Sunshine, Government in the --- Transparence in government --- Corrupt practices --- Economics --- Land use --- Rent seeking --- Open government (Transparency in government) --- Public administration --- Ethics --- Labor --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Demography --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Demographic Economics: General --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Labour --- income economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Civil service & public sector --- Population & demography --- Tax incentives --- Civil service --- Population and demographics --- Population --- Bolivia --- Income economics --- White-collar crime
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Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Monetary policy. --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Infrastructure --- Business and Financial --- Macroeconomics --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Economic History: General --- Political Economy --- Financial Crises --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis --- Housing --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Financial services law & regulation --- Finance --- Financial crises --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Stock markets --- National accounts --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Banking crises --- Banks and banking --- Saving and investment --- Financial services industry --- Law and legislation --- Stock exchanges --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- United States
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Today's news media displays an intense fascination with the global economy--and for good reason. The degree of worldwide economic integration is unprecedented, and rising globalization has lifted living standards and reduced poverty. Foreign markets and new technologies continue to present opportunities for entrepreneurs and corporations. Still, economic shocks can spread across the world in minutes, impacting billions of lives. Citizens are understandably anxious in this age of macroeconomic turbulence and overextended governments. Modern economics offers a powerful framework for understanding globalization, international trade, and economic growth. Many managers possess years of hands-on experience dealing with business cycles and foreign competitive pressures, yet these leaders may not have a solid grounding in economic concepts that shed light on the forces of globalization. This book explains economics in everyday language, using little or no math, giving businesspersons better tools to interpret current events as well as long-term economic and political developments.
International economic relations. --- Globalization. --- economics --- human capital --- financial crisis --- macroeconomics --- comparative advantage --- absolute advantage --- emerging economy --- international trade --- business strategy --- economic growth --- economic history --- international economics --- political economy --- economic development --- industrialization --- labor market --- convergence --- New World --- mercantilism --- Industrial Revolution --- productivity --- technology --- capital control --- intellectual property --- research and development --- productivity slowdown --- Adam Smith --- factor proportions model --- gravity model --- infant industry --- import substitution --- Asian Tiger --- trade policy --- tariff --- public choice --- rent seeking --- trade agreement --- free trade --- liberalization --- information and communications technology --- vertical integration --- supply chain --- poverty trap --- big push --- coordination failure --- industrial policy --- diversification --- value added --- managerial capital --- skill biased technological change --- population growth --- wage inequality --- middle income trap --- tradable sector --- offshoring --- outsourcing --- foreign direct investment --- skill upgrading --- immigration --- wage structure --- regulation --- competitiveness --- corruption --- democracy --- autocracy --- socialism --- communism --- controlled capitalism --- gold standard --- natural resource curse --- business cycle --- collective bargaining --- social insurance --- safety net --- labor union --- Washington Consensus --- multinational enterprise --- exchange rate --- sweatshop --- spillover --- human rights --- labor standard --- property rights --- Dutch disease --- extractive industry --- negative externality --- pollution haven --- greenhouse gas --- global warming --- climate change
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