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Self-knowledge, Theory of.

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In this book, the first systematic study of Socrates's reflections on self-knowledge, Christopher Moore examines the ancient precept 'Know yourself' and, drawing on Plato, Aristophanes, Xenophon, and others, reconstructs and reassesses the arguments about self-examination, personal ideals, and moral maturity at the heart of the Socratic project. What has been thought to be a purely epistemological or metaphysical inquiry turns out to be deeply ethical, intellectual, and social. Knowing yourself is more than attending to your beliefs, discerning the structure of your soul, or recognizing your ignorance - it is constituting yourself as a self who can be guided by knowledge toward the good life. This is neither a wholly introspective nor a completely isolated pursuit: we know and constitute ourselves best through dialogue with friends and critics. This rich and original study will be of interest to researchers in the philosophy of Socrates, selfhood, and ancient thought.

Self (Philosophy) --- Self-knowledge, Theory of. --- Philosophy, Ancient. --- Moi (Philosophie) --- Connaissance de soi --- Philosophie ancienne --- Socrates. --- Self-knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy, Ancient --- Socrates

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This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant's philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation `I think' that the subject's capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant's theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation `I'; 2) an epistemic problem regarding the type of knowledge relative to the thinking subject produced by the representation `I think'; and 3) a strictly metaphysical problem regarding the features assigned to the thinking subject's nature. The author connects the relevant scholarly literature on Kant with contemporary debates on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge. He develops a formal reading according to which the unity of self-consciousness does not presuppose the identity of a real subject, but a formal identity based on the representation `I think'.

Self-knowledge, Theory of. --- Théorie de la connaissance. --- Kant, Immanuel, --- Kant, Immanuel --- Self-knowledge [Theory of ] --- Théorie de la connaissance.

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Education --- Biographical methods --- Self-knowledge, Theory of --- Biography --- Connaissance de soi --- Biographie --- Education - Biographical methods

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"This book argues that we misunderstand the importance of the topic of self-knowledge if we conceive of it merely as a puzzle about how we can know a special range of facts. Instead, we should regard it as an inducement to reflect on the nature of the relevant facts themselves, and of the kind of mind of which they hold. In this sense, the interest of the topic of self-knowledge is metaphysical rather than merely epistemological: its primary importance lies in the light it can shed on what our minds are, rather than just on how we come to know certain facts about them. Appreciating this point puts us in a position to see a link between debates about how we know our own minds and the dark but intriguing idea that Jean-Paul Sartre expressed in his remark that, for a human being, "to exist is always to assume its being" in a way that implies "an understanding of human reality by itself." An implication of thus Sartrean standpoint on self-awareness, I argue, is that our primary form of self-awareness must be transparent: its focus must be, not on ourselves, but on aspects of the non-mental world presented in a way that is informed by an implicit self-awareness. Nevertheless-as I go on to argue-we are necessarily capable of transforming this implicit self-awareness, through reflection, into an explicit understanding of ourselves and our own mental states"--

Philosophical anthropology --- Theory of knowledge --- Self-knowledge, Theory of. --- Connaissance de soi.