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Democratic governments are able to elicit, legally and legitimately, both money and men from their populations. Certainly there is tax evasion, draft evasion, and even outright resistance; yet to a remarkable extent citizens acquiesce and even actively consent to the demands of governments, well beyond the point explicable by coercion. This is a puzzle for social scientists, particularly those who believe that individuals are self-interested, rational actors who calculate only the private egoistic costs and benefits of possible choices. The provisions of collective good should never justify a quasi-voluntary tax payment and the benefits of a war could not possibly exceed the cost of dying. This book explains the institutionalization of policy in response to anticipated and actual citizen behaviour and the conditions under which citizens give, refuse and withdraw their consent. Professor Levi claims that citizens' consent is contingent upon the perceived fairness of both the government and of other citizens. Most citizens of democracies, most of the time, are more likely to give their consent if they believe that government actors and other citizens are behaving fairly toward them.
Allegiance --- Patriotism --- Democracy --- Draft --- Conscientious objection --- #SBIB:023.IO --- #SBIB:321H30 --- #SBIB:324H50 --- Military ethics --- War --- Compulsory military service --- Conscription, Military --- Military conscription --- Military draft --- Military service, Compulsory --- Military training, Universal --- Selective service --- Service, Compulsory military --- Universal military training --- National service --- Recruiting and enlistment --- Conscientious objectors --- Self-government --- Political science --- Equality --- Representative government and representation --- Republics --- Loyalty --- Loyalty, Political --- Political loyalty --- Citizenship --- Hedendaagse politieke en sociale theorieën (vanaf de 19de eeuw): algemeen (incl. utilitarisme, burgerschap) --- Politieke participatie en legitimiteit (referenda, directe democratie, publieke opinie...) --- Moral and ethical aspects --- Social Sciences --- Political Science --- Allegiance. --- Patriotism. --- Democracy. --- Draft. --- Conscientious objection.
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Entreprises --- Concurrence --- Fusion --- Droit
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Economies - and the government institutions that support them - reflect a moral and political choice, a choice we can make and remake. Since the dawn of industrialization and democratization in the late eighteenth century, there has been a succession of political economic frameworks, reflecting changes in technology, knowledge, trade, global connections, political power, and the expansion of citizenship. The challenges of today reveal the need for a new moral political economy that recognizes the politics in political economy. It also requires the redesign of our social, economic, and governing institutions based on assumptions about humans as social beings rather than narrow self-serving individualists. This Element makes some progress toward building a new moral political economy by offering both a theory of change and some principles for institutional (re)design.
Economics --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man --- Moral and ethical aspects. --- Political aspects.
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Social change. --- Social choice. --- Decision making. --- Reasoning. --- Decision making --- Reasoning --- Social change --- Social choice --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics --- Change, Social --- Cultural change --- Cultural transformation --- Societal change --- Socio-cultural change --- Social history --- Social evolution --- Argumentation --- Ratiocination --- Reason --- Thought and thinking --- Judgment (Logic) --- Logic --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Problem solving
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Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important question. By employing rational-choice and game theory, the authors propose a way of extracting empirically testable, general hypotheses from particular cases. The result is both a methodological manifesto and an applied handbook that political scientists, economic historians, sociologists, and students of political economy will find essential.In their jointly written introduction, the authors frame their approach to the origins and evolution of political institutions. The individual essays that follow demonstrate the concept of the analytic narrative--a rational-choice approach to explain political outcomes--in case studies. Avner Greif traces the institutional foundations of commercial expansion in twelfth-century Genoa. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal analyzes how divergent fiscal policies affected absolutist European governments, while Margaret Levi examines the transformation of nineteenth-century conscription laws in France, the United States, and Prussia. Robert Bates explores the emergence of a regulatory organization in the international coffee market. Finally, Barry Weingast studies the institutional foundations of democracy in the antebellum United States and its breakdown in the Civil War. In the process, these studies highlight the economic role of political organizations, the rise and deterioration of political communities, and the role of coercion, especially warfare, in political life. The results are both empirically relevant and theoretically sophisticated.'Analytic Narratives 'is an innovative and provocative work that bridges the gap between the game-theoretic and empirically driven approaches in political economy. Political historians will find the use of rat
Political philosophy. Social philosophy --- History as a science --- Political stability --- Economic History --- International relations --- Game theory --- Rational choice theory --- Economic history --- #SBIB:324H20 --- #SBIB:35H006 --- #SBIB:303H64 --- #A0206PO --- Social choice --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics --- Coexistence --- Foreign affairs --- Foreign policy --- Foreign relations --- Global governance --- Interdependence of nations --- International affairs --- Peaceful coexistence --- World order --- National security --- Sovereignty --- World politics --- Economic conditions --- History, Economic --- Economics --- Destabilization (Political science) --- Political instability --- Stability, Political --- Consensus (Social sciences) --- Legitimacy of governments --- Politologie: theorieën (democratie, comparatieve studieën….) --- Bestuurswetenschappen: theorieën --- Speltheorie --- Economic history. --- Game theory. --- International relations. --- Political stability. --- Rational choice theory. --- HISTORIOGRAPHIE --- EPISTEMOLOGIE --- METHODOLOGIE
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Coopération --- Confiance --- Économie sociale et solidaire --- aspect social
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