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State governments --- State Politics & Government. --- State governments.
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State governments --- State Politics & Government. --- State governments.
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State governments --- State governments. --- Constitutions --- States.
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State legitimacy matters because it transforms power into authority and provides the basis for rule by consent, rather than by coercion. In fragile situations, a lack of legitimacy undermines constructive relations between the state and society, and thus compounds fragility. Multiple sources of legitimacy often compete and conflict, leaving the state unable to impose the ultimate rules of the game. Donors working in fragile environments have paid relatively little attention to legitimacy, instead concentrating their efforts on capacity development and institution building as a way of strengthening state effectiveness. The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations urges donors to pay much more attention to legitimacy. It also invites them to broaden their understanding to encompass aspects of legitimacy that derive from people’s shared beliefs and traditions, not just from Western state models. Finally, it encourages donors to monitor the impact of their interventions so as to avoid undermining state legitimacy. The publication concludes with practical recommendations on how donors can support better relations between state and society in fragile situations.
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The book analyses diplomacy and paradiplomacy in the European Union and in Latin America from a multidisciplinary perspective. The paradiplomacy, as a means of unofficial relationships that reacts differently to the pressure of the international system, despite its relevance and importance, is scarcely analysed by academia.
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"Political economy explanations for fiscal profligacy are dominated by models of bargaining among organized interest groups over group-specific targeted benefits financed by generalized taxation. These models predict that governments consisting of a coalition of political parties spend more than single-party regimes. This paper presents an alternative model-that of populist pressure on political parties to spend more on the general public good, financed by costly income taxation-and obtains the opposite prediction. According to this model, public spending and taxes are lower under coalition governments that can win elections more cheaply. Indeed, in order to win elections, coalition partners need to satisfy a smaller share of swing voters than does a single-party government that enjoys narrower support from its core constituency. A coalition government therefore spends less on the public good to capture the share of the swing vote necessary for re-election. Using data from more than 70 countries during the period 1970-2006, the paper provides robust supporting evidence for this alternative model. "--World Bank web site.
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