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Campaign management --- Political campaigns --- Voter turnout

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Election forecasting --- Mass media and public opinion --- Television in politics --- Voter turnout --- Voting --- United States

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In The Turnout Gap, Bernard L. Fraga offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of the causes and consequences of racial and ethnic disparities in voter turnout. Examining voting for Whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans from the 1800s to the present, Fraga documents persistent gaps in turnout and shows that elections are increasingly unrepresentative of the wishes of all Americans. These gaps persist not because of socioeconomics or voter suppression, but because minority voters have limited influence in shaping election outcomes. As Fraga demonstrates, voters turn out at higher rates when their votes matter; despite demographic change, in most elections and most places, minorities are less electorally relevant than Whites. The Turnout Gap shows that when politicians engage the minority electorate, the power of the vote can win. However, demography is not destiny. It is up to politicians, parties, and citizens themselves to mobilize the potential of all Americans.

Voter turnout --- Political participation --- Minorities --- Voting research --- Citizen participation --- Community action --- Community involvement --- Community participation --- Involvement, Community --- Mass political behavior --- Participation, Citizen --- Participation, Community --- Participation, Political --- Political activity --- Political behavior --- Political rights --- Social participation --- Political activists --- Politics, Practical --- Election turnout --- Turnout (Voting) --- Voting turnout --- Voting --- Voting behavior research --- Elections --- Social aspects --- Research

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This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox—the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election—is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game’s structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.   .

Elections --- Voter turnout --- Voting --- Economic aspects. --- Polls --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Election turnout --- Turnout (Voting) --- Voting turnout --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Political science --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- Elections. --- Game theory. --- Political theory. --- Electoral Politics. --- Game Theory. --- Political Theory. --- Administration --- Civil government --- Commonwealth, The --- Government --- Political theory --- Political thought --- Politics --- Science, Political --- Social sciences --- State, The --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics

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Interest in politics and the political process—topics that economists consider to be the purview of the sub-field of study known as public choice—appears to be as high as ever. This Special Issue aims to provide a collection of high-quality studies covering many of the varied topics traditionally investigated in the growing field of public choice economics. These include expressive and instrumental voting, checks and balances in the enforcement of rules, electoral disproportionality, foreign aid and political freedom, voting cycles, (in)stability of political ideology, federal spending on environmental goods, pork-barrel and general appropriations spending, politics and taxpayer funding for professional sports arenas, and political scandal and “friends-and-neighbors” voting in general elections. In bringing these topics together in one place, this Special Issue offers a mix of conceptual/formal and empirical studies in public choice economics.

rational ignorance --- rector --- n/a --- disproportionality indexes --- electoral quota --- incumbency advantage --- expressive voting --- electoral systems --- reputation capital --- democratic oversight --- roll-call voting --- rational voter apathy --- political economy --- pork-barrel spending --- mining --- elections --- public policy --- checks and balances --- public interest --- majority decision --- United States Congress --- Policy formulation --- confirmation bias --- Germany --- voter turnout --- localism in elections --- Donald Trump --- political scandal --- Altruism --- measurement --- Ghent University --- proportionality --- Sweden --- voting behavior --- friends-and-neighbors voting --- campaign finance --- political elite --- election --- National Football League --- majority judgment --- political ideology --- instrumental voting --- public choice --- Spain --- Leading by example --- Hierarchical games --- constitutional constraints --- seniority