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This book argues that Plato's Charmides presents a unitary but incomplete argument intended to lead its readers to substantive philosophical insights. Through careful, contextually sensitive analysis of Plato's arguments concerning the virtue of sophrosyne, Thomas M. Tuozzo brings the dialogue's lines of inquiry together, carrying Plato's argument forward to a substantive conclusion. This innovative reading of Charmides reverses misconceptions about the dialogue that stemmed from an impoverished conception of Socratic elenchus and unquestioned acceptance of ancient historiography's demonization of Critias. It views Socratic argument as a tool intended to move its addressee to substantive philosophical insights. It also argues, on the basis of recent historical research, a review of the fragments of Critias' oeuvre and Plato's use of Critias in other dialogues, that Plato had a nuanced, generally positive view of Critias. Throughout, readers are alerted to textual difficulties whose proper resolution is crucial to understanding Plato's often abstract arguments.

Morale --- Théorie de la connaissance --- Platon, --- Charmides (Plato) --- Ethics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Plato --- Théorie de la connaissance --- Early works to 1800. --- Ouvrages avant 1800 --- Plato. --- Platon --- Arts and Humanities --- History

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In recent years, most political theorists have agreed that shame shouldn't play any role in democratic politics because it threatens the mutual respect necessary for participation and deliberation. But Christina Tarnopolsky argues that not every kind of shame hurts democracy. In fact, she makes a powerful case that there is a form of shame essential to any critical, moderate, and self-reflexive democratic practice. Through a careful study of Plato's Gorgias, Tarnopolsky shows that contemporary conceptions of shame are far too narrow. For Plato, three kinds of shame and shaming practices were possible in democracies, and only one of these is similar to the form condemned by contemporary thinkers. Following Plato, Tarnopolsky develops an account of a different kind of shame, which she calls "respectful shame." This practice involves the painful but beneficial shaming of one's fellow citizens as part of the ongoing process of collective deliberation. And, as Tarnopolsky argues, this type of shame is just as important to contemporary democracy as it was to its ancient form. Tarnopolsky also challenges the view that the Gorgias inaugurates the problematic oppositions between emotion and reason, and rhetoric and philosophy. Instead, she shows that, for Plato, rationality and emotion belong together, and she argues that political science and democratic theory are impoverished when they relegate the study of emotions such as shame to other disciplines.

Democracy - Philosophy. --- Democracy -- Philosophy. --- Plato. --- Plato. Gorgias. --- Shame - Political aspects. --- Shame -- Political aspects. --- Shame --- Democracy --- Philosophy --- Philosophy & Religion --- Political aspects --- Political aspects. --- Philosophy. --- Emotions --- Guilt --- Ad hominem. --- Allan Bloom. --- Ambiguity. --- Ambivalence. --- Anger. --- Aristotle. --- Athenian Democracy. --- Bernard Williams. --- Callicles. --- Catamite. --- Charmides (dialogue). --- Child abuse. --- Civility. --- Conflation. --- Controversy. --- Criticism. --- Critique. --- Crito. --- Deliberation. --- Demagogue. --- Dialectic. --- Dichotomy. --- Direction of fit. --- Disgust. --- Disposition. --- Distrust. --- Elitism. --- Embarrassment. --- False-consensus effect. --- Forensic rhetoric. --- Form of life (philosophy). --- Freedom of speech. --- Gorgias (dialogue). --- Gorgias. --- Grandiosity. --- Gregory Vlastos. --- Hannah Arendt. --- Hedonism. --- Hippias Major. --- Human Rights Watch. --- Humiliation. --- Ideology. --- Inference. --- Irony. --- Jon Elster. --- McGill University. --- Morality. --- Multitude. --- Myth. --- Nicomachean Ethics. --- Omnipotence. --- On the Soul. --- Ostracism. --- Pathos. --- Perversion. --- Phaedo. --- Phaedrus (dialogue). --- Phenomenon. --- Philosopher. --- Pity. --- Pleonexia. --- Political philosophy. --- Politics. --- Polus. --- Prejudice. --- Princeton University Press. --- Protagoras. --- Psychoanalysis. --- Psychotherapy. --- Public sphere. --- Pythagoreanism. --- Rationality. --- Reason. --- Reintegrative shaming. --- Republic (Plato). --- Result. --- Rhetoric. --- Self-criticism. --- Self-deception. --- Self-esteem. --- Self-image. --- Shame. --- Social stigma. --- Socratic (Community). --- Socratic method. --- Socratic. --- Sophism. --- Sophist. --- Suffering. --- Suggestion. --- Symposium (Plato). --- The Philosopher. --- Theory. --- Thought. --- Thrasymachus. --- Uncertainty. --- Vlastos. --- Vulnerability.