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Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book, first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.

Truth. --- Realism. --- #A0505W --- Realism --- Truth --- Conviction --- Belief and doubt --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism --- Empiricism --- Universals (Philosophy) --- Conceptualism --- Dualism --- Idealism --- Materialism --- Nominalism --- Positivism --- Rationalism --- Arts and Humanities

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This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and sceptical view deriving from Hume that laws assert no more than a regularity of coincidence between instances of properties. In doing so he presents what may become the definitive statement of the case against this position. Professor Armstrong then goes on to establish his own theory in a systematic manner defending it against the most likely objections, and extending both it and the related theory of universals to cover functional and statistical laws. This treatment of the subject is refreshingly concise and vivid: it will both stimulate vigorous professional debate and make an excellent student text.

Natural law --- Philosophy of nature --- Law --- Philosophy --- Law (Philosophy). --- Philosophy of nature. --- Universals (Philosophy) --- Individuation (Philosophy) --- Universaux --- Individu (Philosophie) --- Philosophie de la nature --- Law (Philosophy) --- Nature --- Nature, Philosophy of --- Natural theology --- #GROL:SEMI-130.2:6 --- Arts and Humanities --- Law - Philosophy

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First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Marc Lange, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is available for a new generation of readers.

Philosophy of nature --- Law (Philosophical concept) --- Speculative Philosophy --- Philosophy --- Philosophy & Religion --- Law (Philosophy) --- Nature --- Nature, Philosophy of --- Natural theology --- Philosophy of nature.