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What follows attempts to synthesize Husserl's social ethics and to integrate the themes of this topic into his larger philosophical concerns. Chapter I proceeds with the hypothesis that Husser! believed that all of life could be examined and lived by the transcendental phenomenologist, and therefore action was not something which one did isolated from one's commitment to being philosophical within the noetic-noematic field. Therefore besides attempting to be clear about the meaning of the reduction it relates the reduction to ethical life. Chapter II shows that the agent, properly understood, i. e. , the person, is a moral theme, indeed, reflection on the person involves an ethical reduction which leads into the essentials of moral categoriality, the topic of Chapter IV. Chapter III mediates the transcendental ego, individual person, and the social matrix by showing how the common life comes about and what the constitutive processes and ingredients of this life are. It also shows how the foundations of this life are imbued with themes which adumbrate moral categoriality discussed in Chapter IV. The final Chapters, V and VI, articulate the communitarian ideal, "the godly person of a higher order," emergent in Chapters II, III and IV, in terms of social-political and theological specifications of what this "godly" life looks like.
Social ethics --- Husserl, Edmund --- Morale sociale --- Sociale ethiek --- Husserl, Edmund, --- Ethics --- Morale --- Social ethics. --- Academic collection --- Social problems --- Sociology --- -Ethics --- -Husserl, Edmund --- Husserl, Edmond --- Ethics. --- Husserl (edmund), philosophe allemand, 1859-1938
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Although a key aspect of the phenomenological movement is its contribution to value theory (axiology) and value perception (almost all the major figures devoted a great part of their labors to these topics), there has been relatively little attention paid to these themes. This volume in part makes up for this lacuna by being the first anthology on value-theory in the phenomenological movement. It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing, e.g., the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature. It also contains discussions of most of the major representative figures not only in their own right but also in relationship to one another: Von Ehrenfels, Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, and Derrida.
Values. --- Phenomenology. --- 17.022.13 --- 141.322 --- Philosophy, Modern --- Axiology --- Worth --- Aesthetics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Metaphysics --- Psychology --- Ethics --- Zedelijke idealen. Objectieve waarden --- Fenomenologie --- 141.322 Fenomenologie --- 17.022.13 Zedelijke idealen. Objectieve waarden --- Phenomenology --- Values --- Phenomenology . --- Ethics. --- Modern philosophy. --- Philosophy. --- Modern Philosophy. --- Philosophy, general. --- Mental philosophy --- Humanities --- Modern philosophy --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Philosophy --- Phénoménologie --- Bien (philosophie) --- Valeurs (philosophie) --- Phénoménologie
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If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don't know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?"has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself." For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you? Or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation," such as one's death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers," what we also will call "Existenz." "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one's being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one's normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one's non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation." We will see that it has especial ties to one's Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder."
filosofie
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Metaphysics
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persoonlijkheidsleer
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metafysica
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existentialisme
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godsdienstfilosofie
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Psychology
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metaphysics
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Philosophy
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Religious studies
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Existential phenomenology.
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Transcendentalism.
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Phénoménologie existentielle
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Transcendantalisme
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EPUB-LIV-FT LIVHUMAI SPRINGER-B
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Theory of knowledge
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Academic collection
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#BIBC:boekadm
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