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Christian church history --- Public buildings --- History of the United Kingdom and Ireland --- church towers --- religieuze architectuur --- anno 500-1499 --- York
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Comparative literature --- Pseudo-Aristotle --- Education of princes --- Princes --- Education --- Secretum secretorum --- Kings and rulers --- Secretum secretorum. --- Secreta secretorum --- Sirr al-asrār --- Kitāb al-siyāsah fī tadbīr al-riyāsah --- Siyāsah fī tadbīr al-riyāsah --- Secré de secrez --- Aristote (Pseudo-). Secretum secretorum. --- Aristoteles (Pseudo-). Secretum secretorum. --- Liber Aristotelis de secreto secretorum --- De regimine principium vel regum vel dominorum et aliorum nominum --- Secret book of secrets --- De secreto secretorum
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Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data.
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