Listing 1 - 6 of 6 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
We examine the impact of loss of U.S. patent exclusivity (LOE) on the prices and utilization of specialty drugs between 2001 and 2007. We limit our empirical cohort to drugs commonly used to treat cancer and base our analyses on nationally representative data from IMS Health. We begin by describing the average number of manufacturers entering specialty drugs following LOE. We observe the number of firms entering the production of newly generic specialty drugs ranges between two and five per molecule in the years following LOE. However, the existence of time-varying and unobservable contract manufacturing practices complicates the definition of "manufacturers" entering the market. We use pooled data methods to examine whether the neoclassical relationship between price declines and volume increases upon LOE holds among these drugs. First, we examine the extent to which estimated prices of these drugs undergoing LOE fall with generic entry. Second, we estimate reduced form random effect models of utilization subsequent to LOE. We observe substantial price erosion after generic entry; average monthly price declines appear to be larger among physician-administered drugs (38-46.4%) compared to oral drugs (25-26%). Additionally, we find average prices for drugs produced by branded firms rise and prices for drugs produced by generic firms fall upon LOE; the latter effect is particularly large among oral drugs. In pooled models, volume appears to increase following generic entry, but this result appears to be largely driven by oral drugs. Molecule characteristics, number of manufacturers and 2007Q4 revenues are significant predictors of post-2007 drug shortages. We discuss second best welfare consequences of these results.
Choose an application
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) expends considerable efforts in regulating medications approved for use. Yet the impact of medication labeling changes on brand pharmaceutical products, and whether and what firms do to respond to increased information regarding the safety and efficacy of a drug, have not be characterized. We propose a behavioral framework for examining the effects of FDA advisories on branded pharmaceutical firms and their products. We empirically assess the impact of recent FDA advisories on the stock market valuations of a sample of branded pharmaceutical manufacturing firms using event study methods. We examine whether and how branded pharmaceutical manufacturers respond to an advisory by assessing changes in promotion compared to non-affected firms. We find firms targeted by an advisory have average stock price declines of 3% in three days and 11% in five days following the advisory release, and in turn appear to decrease total physician-directed promotion spending, journals ads and detailing visits significantly six months following the advisory release; the provision of free samples is unaffected. We find no changes among therapeutic substitutes unaffected by the advisory. Results of sensitivity analyses suggest firms with market dominant positions experience similar decreases in stock market valuations and physician-directed promotion compared to pooled results. The results are also robust to alternative definitions of the timing of advisory release dates and the severity of advisories' wording. Theory and empirical results suggest the public release of FDA advisories negatively impacts firm's short-term market valuations. The results suggest an additional rationale for previously documented declines in prescribing after FDA advisory releases – significant declines in physician-directed promotion following FDA advisory releases; the combined (and likely correlated) effects of the release of the advisory and declines in physician-directed promotion on prescribing behavior are likely larger than the sum of the independent effects.
Choose an application
Since the 1984 passage of the Waxman-Hatch Act, generic prescription drugs have become central to disease treatment and generic drug entry and price competition has been vigorous in the U.S. Nonetheless, recent policy concern has focused on potential supply inadequacy and price increases among selected generic drugs. Details regarding the supply of generic drugs throughout the product life cycle are surprisingly unstudied. Here, we examine manufacturer entry, exit, the extent of competition and the relationship between supply structure and inflation adjusted prices among generic drugs. Our empirical approach is descriptive and reduced form, following recent innovations on the older structure-conduct-performance tradition. We employ quarterly national data on quantities, wholesale dollar sales and manufacturers from QuintilesIMS National Sales Perspective data, 2004Q4-2016Q3. Defining a market as the molecule-dosage-form, we observe that median sizes of drug markets are predominantly small, with annual inflation adjusted sales revenues of less than $10 million but increasing over time. The median number of manufacturers in each market is about two, the mean about four. We find evidence to suggest decreasing numbers of suppliers over our study period, particularly following implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 and the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012, attributable both to more exit and less entry. Approximately 40 percent of markets are supplied by one manufacturer; the share of markets supplied by one or two manufacturers is observed to increase over time and is more likely among non-oral drugs and those belonging to selected therapeutic classes. We find evidence to suggest prices of generic drugs are statistically significantly increasing over time, particularly following the implementation of the 2010 Affordable Care Act and the 2012 Generic Drug User Fee Amendments. Price increases are positively correlated with reduced manufacturer counts and alternative measures of increased supplier concentration, holding all else constant. Our results suggest the market for generic drugs is largely comprised of small revenue products the supply of which has tended towards duopoly or monopoly in recent years. Therefore, it is surprising generic drug prices have not been observed to be higher and potentially risen more over our study period. This issue merits further study; we suggest several testable hypotheses based in economic theory.
Choose an application
Regulation can influence the structure, conduct and performance of consumer product markets and the structure of product markets can influence regulation. Since the vast majority of prescription drugs consumed by Americans are generic, the structure of the U.S. generic prescription drug market is of wide interest. The supply of prescription drugs in the U.S. is also heavily regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). We describe events leading up to the passage and implementation of the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments in 2012 (GDUFA I), and compare its FDA commitments, provisions, goals and fee structure to that of the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) for branded drugs. Although GDUFA I expires September 30, 2017, reauthorization for GDUFA II is currently underway and is likely to shift the user fee structure away from annual facility fees to annual program fees. We explain how the fee structure of GDUFA I, and that being considered for GDUFA II, erects barriers to entry and creates scale and scope economies for incumbent manufacturers of generic drugs. Furthermore, in order to implement fees under GDUFA I, FDA required the submission of self-reported data on generic manufacturing practices including domestic and foreign active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) and finished dosage form (FDF) facilities. These data provide an unprecedented window into the recent evolution of generic drug manufacturing markets. Our analyses of these data suggest that generic drug manufacturing in 2017 is quite concentrated: a very large portion of ANDA holders have small portfolios consisting of less than five ANDAs, while a small number of very large ANDA holders have portfolios consisting of hundreds or even thousands of ANDAs. The number of API and FDF facilities have each declined by approximately 10-11% between 2013 and 2017. Furthermore, in 2017, generic manufacturing is largely foreign and has become increasingly so since 2013. We discuss the implications of the current structure of the U.S. generic prescription drug market for GDUFA II ratification and implementation.
Choose an application
Choose an application
Drugs like bevacizumab ($50,000 per treatment episode) and ipilimumab ($120,000 per episode) have fueled the perception that the launch prices of anticancer drugs are increasing over time. Using an original dataset of 58 anticancer drugs approved between 1995 and 2013, we find that launch prices, adjusted for inflation and drugs' survival benefits, increased by 10%, or about $8,500, per year. Although physicians are not penalized for prescribing costly drugs, they may be reluctant to prescribe drugs with prices that exceed subjective standards of fairness. Manufacturers may set higher launch prices over time as standards evolve. Pricing trends may also reflect manufacturers' response to expansions in the 340B Drug Pricing Program, which requires manufacturers to provide steep discounts to eligible providers.
Listing 1 - 6 of 6 |
Sort by
|