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How did a handful of savings and loan executives bring about one of the worst financial disasters of the twentieth century? Examining the S & L crisis as a series of white-collar crimes unparalleled in the history of the United States, Kitty Calavita, Henry Pontell, and Robert Tillman debunk a number of the myths that permeate popular understanding of this multi-billion-dollar disaster. Tempted by the insurance net and federal deregulation aimed at encouraging growth in the banking industry, S & L leaders deliberately defrauded their depositors, stole from their own corporations, and speculated on high-risk ventures with government-insured capital. What the government ultimately chalked up to failed business investments and a sluggish economy, Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman identify as a new type of white-collar crime, committed deliberately against S & L customers and the government. Using material gathered in over one hundred interviews with government officials and recently declassified documents, Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman draw disturbing conclusions about the deliberate nature of the crimes, the political collusion they involved, and the leniency of the justice system in dealing with "big money" criminals.

Savings and loan associations --- Savings and Loan Bailout, 1989-1995. --- Commercial crimes --- Savings and Loan Bailout, 1989-1995 --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Banking --- Corporate crime --- Crimes, Financial --- Financial crimes --- Offenses affecting the public trade --- Crime --- Bailout of Savings and Loan Associations, 1989-1995 --- Savings and Loan Associations Bailout, 1989-1995 --- Corrupt practices