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Does science aim at providing an account of the world that is literally true or objectively true? Understanding the difference requires paying close attention to metaphor and its role in science. In The Third Lens, Andrew S. Reynolds argues that metaphors, like microscopes and other instruments, are a vital tool in the construction of scientific knowledge and explanations of how the world works. More than just rhetorical devices for conveying difficult ideas, metaphors provide the conceptual means with which scientists interpret and intervene in the world. Reynolds here investigates the role of metaphors in the creation of scientific concepts, theories, and explanations, using cell theory as his primary case study. He explores the history of key metaphors that have informed the field and the experimental, philosophical, and social circumstances under which they have emerged, risen in popularity, and in some cases faded from view. How we think of cells-as chambers, organisms, or even machines-makes a difference to scientific practice. Consequently, an accurate picture of how scientific knowledge is made requires us to understand how the metaphors scientists use-and the social values that often surreptitiously accompany them-influence our understanding of the world, and, ultimately, of ourselves. The influence of metaphor isn't limited to how we think about cells or proteins: in some cases they can even lead to real material change in the very nature of the thing in question, as scientists use technology to alter the reality to fit the metaphor. Drawing out the implications of science's reliance upon metaphor, The Third Lens will be of interest to anyone working in the areas of history and philosophy of science, science studies, cell and molecular biology, science education and communication, and metaphor in general.

Cytology. --- Cells. --- Metaphor. --- Science --- History. --- cell biology. --- cell theory. --- cell. --- explanation. --- metaphor. --- scientific realism.

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Both a history and a metahistory, Representing Electrons focuses on the development of various theoretical representations of electrons from the late 1890s to 1925 and the methodological problems associated with writing about unobservable scientific entities. Using the electron—or rather its representation—as a historical actor, Theodore Arabatzis illustrates the emergence and gradual consolidation of its representation in physics, its career throughout old quantum theory, and its appropriation and reinterpretation by chemists. As Arabatzis develops this novel biographical approach, he portrays scientific representations as partly autonomous agents with lives of their own. Furthermore, he argues that the considerable variance in the representation of the electron does not undermine its stable identity or existence. Raising philosophical issues of contentious debate in the history and philosophy of science—namely, scientific realism and meaning change—Arabatzis addresses the history of the electron across disciplines, integrating historical narrative with philosophical analysis in a book that will be a touchstone for historians and philosophers of science and scientists alike.

Electrons --- Science --- Realism. --- Empiricism --- Philosophy --- Universals (Philosophy) --- Conceptualism --- Dualism --- Idealism --- Materialism --- Nominalism --- Positivism --- Rationalism --- Normal science --- Philosophy of science --- Corpuscular theory of matter --- Atoms --- Leptons (Nuclear physics) --- Matter --- Particles (Nuclear physics) --- Cathode rays --- Ions --- Positrons --- History. --- Philosophy. --- Constitution --- Realism --- History --- Electrons - History --- Science - Philosophy --- electrons, science, invisible, unobservable, representation, physics, quantum theory, chemistry, scientific realism, philosophy, karl popper, discovery, meaning change, theoretical entities, hypothesis, zeeman effect, ion, lorentz, relativity, corpuscle, thomson, gn lewis, irving langmuir, goudsmit, uhlenbeck, putnam, hacking, feyerabend, kuhn, historicism, nonfiction.

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Robert John Ackermann deals decisively with the problem of relativism that has plagued post-empiricist philosophy of science. Recognizing that theory and data are mediated by data domains (bordered data sets produced by scientific instruments), he argues that the use of instruments breaks the dependency of observation on theory and thus creates a reasoned basis for scientific objectivity.Originally published in 1985.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Logic. --- Science --- Argumentation --- Deduction (Logic) --- Deductive logic --- Dialectic (Logic) --- Logic, Deductive --- Intellect --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Reasoning --- Thought and thinking --- Science and society --- Sociology of science --- Normal science --- Philosophy of science --- Social aspects. --- Philosophy. --- Methodology --- Ad hominem. --- Alternative hypothesis. --- Analogy. --- Analytic–synthetic distinction. --- Basic research. --- Bayesian probability. --- Behavioural sciences. --- Branches of science. --- Calculation. --- Case study. --- Circumlocution. --- Concept. --- Consciousness. --- Critical theory. --- Decision-making. --- Deductive-nomological model. --- Design of experiments. --- Dialectic. --- Emergence. --- Empiricism. --- Engineering. --- Epistemology. --- Experiment. --- Experimental data. --- Explanation. --- Explanatory model. --- Fact. --- Finalization. --- Form of life (philosophy). --- Grand theory. --- Heuristic. --- Historical method. --- Historicism. --- Holism. --- Human science. --- Hypothesis. --- Hypothetico-deductive model. --- Idealization. --- Ideology. --- Inductive reasoning. --- Inference. --- Instrumentalism. --- Interaction. --- Knowledge and Human Interests. --- Laboratory Life. --- Mathematics. --- Mechanism design. --- Methodology. --- Modern physics. --- Natural science. --- Objectivity (science). --- Observation. --- Ontology. --- Paradigm shift. --- Paradigm. --- Phenomenon. --- Philosopher. --- Philosophical analysis. --- Philosophical theory. --- Philosophy of science. --- Phrenology. --- Planck's principle. --- Positivism. --- Potentiality and actuality. --- Prediction. --- Probability theory. --- Proofs and Refutations. --- Pseudoscience. --- Quantification (science). --- Reagent. --- Reason. --- Relativism. --- Research program. --- Result. --- Science policy. --- Science. --- Scientific method. --- Scientific progress. --- Scientific realism. --- Scientific theory. --- Scientist. --- Situational analysis. --- Sociology. --- Sophistication. --- Subjectivism. --- Testability. --- The Conceptual Framework. --- The Structure of Science. --- Theoretical definition. --- Theoretical physics. --- Theory. --- Thomas Kuhn. --- Thought experiment. --- Thought. --- Transcendental arguments. --- Type theory. --- Utilitarianism. --- Verificationism. --- Verisimilitude.