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The concept of 'real legal certainty' provides a much needed corrective to the general attention for legal certainty in this day and age. It emphasises relations between citizens, adds socio-legal insight, provides a 'view from below, ' and thus leads to more realistic insights on how to build state institutions. The concept was introduced by Leiden University's professor of Law and Governance in Developing countries Jan Michiel Otto, and can be considered a central pillar of his work. Against the backdrop of an ever-increasing interest in 'legal certainty' in policy-making and academia, friends and colleagues of Jan Michiel Otto engage with the concept provide a wide variety of examples of its relevance. Drawing on case material from all over the world, they show how real legal certainty can be understood in a bottom-up manner and how it is relevant for building state institutions. They also show how the concept can gain in relevance by taking into account actors other than the state. In all, the edited volume is important reading for all whom share professor Otto's interest in what it takes to bridge law in the books and law in action.

Legal certainty. --- Certainty of law --- Jurisprudence --- Law --- Interpretation and construction --- Legal Certainty, State Institutions, Law, Governance.

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"Examining general principles of law provides one of the most instructive examples of the intersection between EU law and comparative law. This collection draws on the expertise of high-profile and distinguished scholars to provide a critical examination of this interaction. It shows how general principles of EU law need to be responsive to national laws. In addition, it is clear that the laws of the Member States have no choice but to be responsive to the general principles which are developed through EU law. Viewed through the perspective of proportionality, legal certainty, and fundamental rights, the dynamic relationship between the ingenuity of the Court of Justice, the legislative process and the process of Treaty revision is comprehensively illustrated."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

Comparative law --- Customary law --- International and municipal law --- Law --- Legal certainty --- Proportionality in law --- Court of Justice (Court of Justice of the European Union)

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Law --- Derecho --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutes --- Statutory construction --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Interpretation and construction. --- Interpretación. --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction

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This book considers an important and largely neglected area of Islamic law by exploring how medieval Muslim jurists resolved criminal cases that could not be proven beyond a doubt, calling into question a controversial popular notion about Islamic law today, which is that Islamic law is a divine legal tradition that has little room for discretion or doubt, particularly in Islamic criminal law. Despite its contemporary popularity, that notion turns out to have been far outside the mainstream of Islamic law for most of its history. Instead of rejecting doubt, medieval Muslim scholars largely embraced it. In fact, they used doubt to enlarge their own power and to construct Islamic criminal law itself. Through examination of legal, historical, and theological sources, and a range of illustrative case studies, this book shows that Muslim jurists developed a highly sophisticated and regulated system for dealing with Islam's unique concept of doubt, which evolved from the seventh to the sixteenth century.

Criminal law (Islamic law) --- Belief and doubt --- Legal certainty --- Legal maxims (Islamic law) --- Islamic law --- Interpretation and construction --- History --- Belief and doubt. --- Legal certainty. --- HISTORY --- Islam. --- Strafrecht. --- Rechtsgrundsatz. --- Auslegung. --- Interpretation and construction. --- History. --- General. --- Criminal law (Islamic law) - Interpretation and construction --- Legal maxims (Islamic law) - History --- Islamic law - Interpretation and construction --- Uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic law) --- Certainty of law --- Jurisprudence --- Law --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Skepticism --- Uṣūl al-Fiqh

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This book presents a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation, by a leading judge and legal theorist. Currently, legal philosophers and jurists apply different theories of interpretation to constitutions, statutes, rules, wills, and contracts. Aharon Barak argues that an alternative approach--purposive interpretation--allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important differences. Moreover, regardless of whether purposive interpretation amounts to a unifying theory, it would still be superior to other methods of interpretation in tackling each kind of text separately. Barak explains purposive interpretation as follows: All legal interpretation must start by establishing a range of semantic meanings for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In purposive interpretation, the text's "purpose" is the criterion for establishing which of the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning. Establishing the ultimate purpose--and thus the legal meaning--depends on the relationship between the subjective and objective purposes; that is, between the original intent of the text's author and the intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the time of interpretation. This is easy to establish when the subjective and objective purposes coincide. But when they don't, the relative weight given to each purpose depends on the nature of the text. For example, subjective purpose is given substantial weight in interpreting a will; objective purpose, in interpreting a constitution. Barak develops this theory with masterful scholarship and close attention to its practical application. Throughout, he contrasts his approach with that of textualists and neotextualists such as Antonin Scalia, pragmatists such as Richard Posner, and legal philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin. This book represents a profoundly important contribution to legal scholarship and a major alternative to interpretive approaches advanced by other leading figures in the judicial world.

Legal theory and methods. Philosophy of law --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutory construction --- Semantics (Law) --- Law --- Jurisprudence --- Statutes --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Philosophy. --- Interpretation and construction. --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction --- 340.11 --- 340.11 Rechtstheorie. Rechtsvinding--(algemeen) --- Rechtstheorie. Rechtsvinding--(algemeen) --- Philosophy --- Semantics (Law).