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Law --- Derecho --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutes --- Statutory construction --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Interpretation and construction. --- Interpretación. --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction

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This book presents a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation, by a leading judge and legal theorist. Currently, legal philosophers and jurists apply different theories of interpretation to constitutions, statutes, rules, wills, and contracts. Aharon Barak argues that an alternative approach--purposive interpretation--allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important differences. Moreover, regardless of whether purposive interpretation amounts to a unifying theory, it would still be superior to other methods of interpretation in tackling each kind of text separately. Barak explains purposive interpretation as follows: All legal interpretation must start by establishing a range of semantic meanings for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In purposive interpretation, the text's "purpose" is the criterion for establishing which of the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning. Establishing the ultimate purpose--and thus the legal meaning--depends on the relationship between the subjective and objective purposes; that is, between the original intent of the text's author and the intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the time of interpretation. This is easy to establish when the subjective and objective purposes coincide. But when they don't, the relative weight given to each purpose depends on the nature of the text. For example, subjective purpose is given substantial weight in interpreting a will; objective purpose, in interpreting a constitution. Barak develops this theory with masterful scholarship and close attention to its practical application. Throughout, he contrasts his approach with that of textualists and neotextualists such as Antonin Scalia, pragmatists such as Richard Posner, and legal philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin. This book represents a profoundly important contribution to legal scholarship and a major alternative to interpretive approaches advanced by other leading figures in the judicial world.

Legal theory and methods. Philosophy of law --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutory construction --- Semantics (Law) --- Law --- Jurisprudence --- Statutes --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Philosophy. --- Interpretation and construction. --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction --- 340.11 --- 340.11 Rechtstheorie. Rechtsvinding--(algemeen) --- Rechtstheorie. Rechtsvinding--(algemeen) --- Philosophy --- Semantics (Law).

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This book examines legal language as a language for special purposes, evaluating the functions and characteristics of legal language and the terminology of law. Using examples drawn from major and lesser legal languages, it examines the major legal languages themselves, beginning with Latin through German, French, Spanish and English. The work will be a valuable resource for students, researchers and practitioners in the areas of legal history and theory, comparative law, semiotics, and linguistics. It will also be of interest to legal translators and terminologists

Law --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutes --- Statutory construction --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Language, Legal --- Legal language --- Legal style --- Style, Legal --- Bill drafting --- Language. --- Interpretation and construction. --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction --- 800.52 --- 800.52 Vergelijkende taalkunde --- Vergelijkende taalkunde --- Language

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After years of teaching law courses to undergraduate, graduate, and law students, Michael Evan Gold has come to believe that the traditional way of teaching - analysis, explanation, and example - is superior to the Socratic Method for students at the outset of their studies.In courses taught Socratically, even the most gifted students can struggle, and many others are lost in a fog for months. Gold offers a meta approach to teaching legal reasoning, bringing the process of argumentation to the fore.Using examples both from the law and from daily life, Gold's book will help undergraduates and first-year law students to understand legal discourse. The book analyzes and illustrates the principles of legal reasoning, such as logical deduction, analogies and distinctions, and application of law to fact, and even solves the mystery of how to spot an issue.In Gold's experience, students who understand the principles of analytical thinking are able to understand arguments, to evaluate and reply to them, and ultimately to construct sound arguments of their own.

Reasoning. --- Law --- Legal reasoning --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutes --- Statutory construction --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Argumentation --- Ratiocination --- Reason --- Thought and thinking --- Judgment (Logic) --- Logic --- Interpretation and construction. --- Methodology. --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction

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This book intends to help understand and apply principles and rules better. Its target is to keep the distinction between principles and rules whereas structuring it on different foundations than those jurisprudence ordinarily employs. The first object of investigation is the phenomenon of interpretation in Law in order to understand that the classification of certain normative species as either principles or rules depends in the first place on axiological connections that are not ready prior to the interpretation process that unveils them. Then, a definition of principles is proposed, aiming to understand what their unique characteristics are when compared to other norms of the legal order. Thirdly, the conditions for the application of principles and rules are examined, which are the normative applicative postulates. It will be shown, on one hand, that principles not only explicit values, but also set forth precise species of behaviors, though indirectly; on the other hand, the creation of conducts by rules is also to be weighed, even though the behavior set forth in advance may be overcome, depending on the accomplishment of a few requirements. That will surpass both the mere praise of values, which does not create behaviors, and the automatic application of rules. A model is proposed to explain the normative species, which includes structured weighing on the application process while encompassing substantive criteria of justice in its argument, through the analytical reconstruction of the concrete use of normative postulates, especially those of reasonableness and proportionality. All of that is done with a focus on the ability of intersubjective control of the argumentation, which often degenerates into capricious decisionism. "Although there are books about legal rules, and although the role of legal principles has been a focus of legal theory since Dworkin, there has yet to be a serious systematic study of what legal principles are, where they come from, how they are identified, and how precisely they intersect with other sources in legal argument and legal decision-making. Professor Avila's much-needed book fills this gap with rigor, depth, and creativity, and it should become essential reading for anyone interested in legal reasoning and legal argumentation." Frederick Schauer, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA.

Law --- Rule of law. --- Jurisprudence. --- Interpretation and construction. --- Supremacy of law --- Administrative law --- Constitutional law --- Analogy (Law) --- Construction and interpretation (Law) --- Construction and interpretation of statutes --- Interpretation and construction (Law) --- Statutes --- Statutory construction --- Judicial discretion --- Judicial process --- Legal certainty --- Philosophy --- Construction --- Interpretation and construction --- Constitutional law. --- Fundamentals of Law. --- Constitutional Law. --- Theories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History. --- Constitutional limitations --- Constitutionalism --- Constitutions --- Limitations, Constitutional --- Public law --- Law—Philosophy. --- Law. --- Acts, Legislative --- Enactments, Legislative --- Laws (Statutes) --- Legislative acts --- Legislative enactments --- Jurisprudence --- Legislation