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This paper provides novel evidence on status goods, using a series of field experiments with an Indonesian bank that markets platinum credit cards to high-income customers. In a first experiment, the paper shows that demand for the platinum card greatly exceeds demand for a nondescript control product with identical benefits, suggesting demand for the pure status aspect of the card. Transaction data reveal that platinum cards are more likely to be used in social contexts, implying social image motivations. Combining price variation with information on the use of the card sheds light on the magnitude of the demand for social status. A second experiment provides evidence of positional externalities from the consumption of these status goods. The final experiment shows that increasing self-esteem causally reduces demand for status goods. This suggests that part of the demand for status is psychological in nature, and that social image is a substitute for self-image.

Conspicuous Consumption --- Social Signaling --- Status Goods

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Traffic engineering --- Traffic flow --- Highway capacity --- Capacity, Highway --- Traffic capacity, Highway --- Traffic volume --- Traffic surveys --- Traffic density --- Engineering, Traffic --- Road traffic --- Street traffic --- Traffic, City --- Traffic control --- Traffic regulation --- Urban traffic --- Highway engineering --- Transportation engineering --- Computer simulation --- E-books --- Traffic engineering. --- Traffic signs and signals. --- Road signs --- Roads --- Roadside traffic signs --- Traffic control devices --- Traffic signaling --- Transportation, Automotive --- Highway communications --- Signs and signboards --- Transportation markings --- Mathematical models. --- Signs --- Traffic signs --- Accessories

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Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis--pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior--show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, A Cooperative Species provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.

Cooperation. --- Cooperativeness. --- Behavior evolution. --- Behavioral evolution --- Cooperation (Psychology) --- Collaborative economy --- Cooperative distribution --- Cooperative movement --- Distribution, Cooperative --- Peer-to-peer economy --- Sharing economy --- Evolutionary psychology --- Social psychology --- Economics --- Profit-sharing --- Cooperation --- Cooperativeness --- Behavior evolution --- E-books --- Australia. --- altruism. --- altruistic cooperation. --- altruistic punishment. --- ancestral humans. --- behavior. --- beliefs. --- coevolution. --- common good. --- constraints. --- coordinated punishment. --- correlated equilibrium. --- costly signaling. --- cultural transmission. --- culture. --- early humans. --- equilibrium selection. --- ethical norms. --- evolution. --- evolutionary dynamics. --- fitness-reducing norm. --- fitness. --- folk theorem. --- foragers. --- free-riders. --- free-riding. --- gene-culture coevolution. --- genetic differentiation. --- genetic inheritance. --- group competition. --- group membership. --- guilt. --- helping behavior. --- hostility. --- human cooperation. --- hunter-gatherer society. --- inclusive fitness. --- indirect reciprocity. --- institutions. --- intergroup conflict. --- internalization. --- multi-level selection. --- norms. --- parochial altruism. --- parochialism. --- peer pressure. --- phenotypic expression. --- positive assortment. --- preferences. --- prehistoric human society. --- private information. --- prosocial behavior. --- public goods game. --- public information. --- punishment. --- reciprocal altruism. --- repeated game. --- reproductive leveling. --- sacrifice. --- selective extinction. --- self-interest. --- shame. --- social behavior. --- social dilemmas. --- social emotions. --- social institutions. --- social interactions. --- social norms. --- social order. --- social preferences. --- socialization. --- sociobiology. --- strong reciprocity. --- within-group segmentation.