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This title provides an account of a new theory and method of voting, judging and ranking, 'majority judgement', shown to be superior to all other known methods.

Social choice --- Voting --- Ranking and selection (Statistics) --- Operational research. Game theory --- Social choice. --- Voting. --- Selection and ranking (Statistics) --- Mathematical statistics --- Order statistics --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Suffrage --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics --- SOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/General --- E-books --- Balloting

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Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, non-dictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

Voting --- Social choice --- Probabilities --- Voting - Mathematical models --- Social choice - Mathematical models --- Probabilities - Mathematical models --- Arrow, Kenneth Joseph, - 1921-2017 --- Voting. --- Social choice. --- Probabilities. --- Mathematical models. --- Balloting --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Suffrage --- Probability --- Statistical inference --- Combinations --- Mathematics --- Chance --- Least squares --- Mathematical statistics --- Risk --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics

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The remolding of the state from an autocratic to a democratic one in postwar Japan is sometimes regarded as a successful case of external intervention for state-building. When Americans landed in Japan two weeks after Japan's acceptance of unconditional surrender, they expected to meet a fanatic and intransigent people. Instead they were surprised by the orderly and peaceful behavior of Japanese soldiers and citizens (Tamaki 2005, 13-20). Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (into their home towns/villages) of millions of soldiers proceeded surprisingly smooth between 1945 and 1948. The authoritarian state gave way to a democratic one within two years of the beginning of the American occupation and democracy has persisted since1. And finally, the Japanese economy had already begun to experience high growth when the occupation ended in April 1952. In every respect, American occupation policies seem to have been successful. Against this image of the American occupation in Japan, this paper will argue that American policies were only partially helpful in the democratic remolding and economic development of postwar Japan. The prewar political and economic experiences of the Japanese themselves, and the psychological impact of the defeat, played equally important roles in the democratic rebirth of the Japanese state. Those in search of solutions to the development challenges facing fragile countries today should understand that Japan's 'success' did not begin in 1945 and was not the result of a peace settlement quickly followed by new institutions. The ground work for Japanese success was 80-90 years in the making. Analysis of state-building, economic development and democracy in Japan must start from the Meiji restoration of 1868.

Accountability --- Civil War --- Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- Corruption & anticorruption Law --- Crime --- Debt --- Democracies --- Developing Countries --- E-Government --- Economic Development --- Elections --- Governance --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Industrialization --- Law and Development --- Leadership --- Mass Media --- National Security --- Observers --- Parliamentary Government --- Political Institutions --- Political Parties --- Population Policies --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Primary Education --- Public Opinion --- Respect --- Skilled Workers --- Social Unrest --- Sovereignty --- Suffrage --- Terrorism --- Treaties --- Unions --- Violence

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Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly. One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.

Elections - Mathematical models. --- Elections -- Mathematical models. --- Finance, Public - Mathematical models. --- Finance, Public -- Mathematical models. --- Voting - Mathematical models. --- Voting -- Mathematical models. --- Voting --- Elections --- Finance, Public --- Government - General --- Political Institutions & Public Administration - General --- Law, Politics & Government --- Mathematical models --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Polls --- Mathematical models. --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Political science --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- JSTOR-DDA --- Public finance --- Multi-User. --- E-books --- Balloting

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Public economics --- Bureaucracy --- Representative government and representation --- Bureaucratie --- Gouvernement représentatif --- Bureaucracy. --- Representative government and representation. --- AA / International- internationaal --- US / United States of America - USA - Verenigde Staten - Etats Unis --- 350.0 --- 350.2 --- Organisatie van het openbaar bestuur: algemeenheden. --- Overheidspersoneel. --- Gouvernement représentatif --- #SBIB:35H006 --- #SBIB:IO --- 336.1 --- 336.1 Public finance, government finance in general --- Public finance, government finance in general --- Parliamentary government --- Political representation --- Representation --- Self-government --- Constitutional history --- Constitutional law --- Political science --- Democracy --- Elections --- Republics --- Suffrage --- Interorganizational relations --- Public administration --- Organizational sociology --- Bestuurswetenschappen: theorieën --- Organisatie van het openbaar bestuur: algemeenheden --- Overheidspersoneel --- Économie publique --- Politique économique --- Theorie de la bureaucratie --- Économie publique --- Politique économique