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Pressure groups --- Industrial policy --- Functional representation --- Political science --- Representative government and representation --- Lobbying --- Policy networks --- Political action committees --- Social control --- Advocacy groups --- Interest groups --- Political interest groups --- Special interest groups (Pressure groups) --- Turkey --- Economic conditions --- Economic policy.

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Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union.

Majorities --- Majorities. --- Pressure groups --- Pressure groups. --- Representative government and representation --- Representative government and representation. --- Parliamentary government --- Political representation --- Representation --- Self-government --- Constitutional history --- Constitutional law --- Political science --- Democracy --- Elections --- Republics --- Suffrage --- Advocacy groups --- Interest groups --- Political interest groups --- Special interest groups (Pressure groups) --- Functional representation --- Lobbying --- Policy networks --- Political action committees --- Social control --- Voting --- Minorities --- E-books

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This paper investigates to what extent media impacts political decisions. A viable practical approach to test the relationship between mass media and political actions is through the use of the World Bank's Doing Business data, specifically, by assessing local media coverage of Doing Business and implementation of business regulatory reforms. The tested hypothesis is that countries with higher media coverage of Doing Business tend to carry out more business regulatory reforms, assuming one- and two-year lags between media coverage and reform implementation. To achieve this objective, the study put together a comprehensive data set that encompasses country-specific local media coverage of the Doing Business report in 190 economies. The study finds that local media coverage of Doing Business has a significant influence on regulators' actions. First, the analysis shows that the number of local media articles tends to increase the probability of whether a country does any reform. Second, countries with greater media coverage of Doing Business indicators tend to have higher numbers of implemented reforms.

Broadcast and Media --- Business Environment --- Business Reform --- Corruption Perception Index --- Development --- Doing Business --- Enterprise Development and Reform --- Firm Entry --- Freedom of the Press --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Legal Regulation and Business Environment --- Media --- Media Coverage --- Political Action --- Private Sector Development --- Private Sector Economics --- Public Sector Development --- Regulation

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"This volume outlines a new agenda for the study of advocacy. We focus on particular advocacy actors, NGO advocacy organizations, involved in public advocacy. We begin with the premise that since advocacy is a collective endeavor, advocacy NGOs should be viewed as actors pursuing collective action. Collective action issues should therefore bear upon their emergence and strategies. We draw on the firm analogy, modeling advocacy NGOs as "firms" operating in competitive policy markets. The firm analogy is instructive because individuals via advocacy NGOs make analytically similar choices regarding the collective organization of their social, political, and economic activities"-- "Advocacy organizations are viewed as actors motivated primarily by principled beliefs. This volume outlines a new agenda for the study of advocacy organizations, proposing a model of NGOs as collective actors that seek to fulfil normative concerns and instrumental incentives, face collective action problems, and compete as well as collaborate with other advocacy actors. The firm analogy is a useful way of studying advocacy actors because individuals via advocacy NGOs make choices which are analytically similar to those that shareholders make in the context of firms. The authors view advocacy NGOs as special types of firms that make strategic choices in policy markets which, along with creating public goods, support organizational survival, visibility, and growth. Advocacy NGOs' strategy can therefore be understood as a response to opportunities to supply distinct advocacy products to well defined constituencies as well as a response to normative or principled concerns"--

Pressure groups --- Social advocacy --- Advocacy, Social --- Social service advocacy --- Social work advocacy --- Social service --- Advocacy groups --- Interest groups --- Political interest groups --- Special interest groups (Pressure groups) --- Functional representation --- Political science --- Representative government and representation --- Lobbying --- Policy networks --- Political action committees --- Social control --- E-books --- #SBIB:324H74 --- Politieke verandering: sociale bewegingen --- Pressure groups. --- Social advocacy. --- International movements --- Law of international organizations --- World history --- Social Sciences --- Political Science

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The classical model of international lawmaking posits governments as exclusively authoritative actors. However, commercially-oriented entities have long been protagonists within the prevailing international legal order, concluding contracts and resolving disputes with governments. Is the international legal personality of corporations undergoing further qualitative transformations ? Corporations influence the State practice constitutive of custom and create, refashion or challenge normative rules. The corporate willingness to fill legal lacunae where governments do not exercise their full regulatory responsibility is also observable through resort to alternative legal mechanisms. Corporations moreover contribute directly to treaty negotiations and occupy crucial roles during subsequent implementation. Indeed, an analysis of the access conditions and participatory modalities for non-State actors could support a right to participate under common international procedural law. Their substantive contributions are also evident when corporations participate in enforcing international law against governments through national courts, diplomatic protection (including the WTO) and arbitration (including NAFTA). However, the practice of intergovernmental organizations reveals several challenges including managing corporate interaction with developing country governments and other non-State actors. Acknowledging corporate contributions also has important implications for national regulatory autonomy, the ability of governments to mediate contested policy issues, the democratic legitimacy of the contemporary lawmaking process and an understanding of consent as the underlying basis for international law.

International business enterprises. --- International law. --- Legislation. --- Pressure groups. --- Soft law. --- Treaties. --- International law --- Legislation --- Treaties --- Soft law --- International business enterprises --- Pressure groups --- International Law - General --- International Law --- Law, Politics & Government --- Advocacy groups --- Interest groups --- Political interest groups --- Special interest groups (Pressure groups) --- Business enterprises, International --- Corporations, International --- Global corporations --- International corporations --- MNEs (International business enterprises) --- Multinational corporations --- Multinational enterprises --- Transnational corporations --- Extralegal norms --- Agreements, International --- Conventions (Treaties) --- International agreements --- Legislative process --- Law of nations --- Nations, Law of --- Public international law --- Law and legislation --- Functional representation --- Political science --- Representative government and representation --- Lobbying --- Policy networks --- Political action committees --- Social control --- Business enterprises --- Corporations --- Joint ventures --- Social norms --- International obligations --- Law --- E-books