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The Stability and Growth Pact has been a success in numerous EU countries, especially in guiding them toward underlying fiscal balance ahead of population aging. These countries tend to be smaller, subject to greater macroeconomic volatility, and reliant on a form of fiscal governance that emphasizes targets and contracts. Most of the new members share these characteristics. For the countries less compatible with the Pact, domestic governance reforms that increase the reputational costs for noncompliance can be useful complements to the fiscal framework.

Electronic books. -- local. --- Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Monetary unions -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Political Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Public Finance --- Fiscal policy --- Monetary unions --- Econometric models. --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Common currencies --- Currency areas --- Currency unions --- Optimum currency areas --- Government policy --- Economic policy --- Finance, Public --- Currency question --- Money --- Macroeconomics --- Production and Operations Management --- Fiscal Policy --- Macroeconomics: Production --- Fiscal governance --- Fiscal stance --- Output gap --- Fiscal rules --- Production --- Economic theory --- Belgium

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The paper analyzes some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greater "procedural" flexibility in the Pact's implementation may improve welfare. Procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply judgment on underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality measures. Budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy; therefore, better monitoring and greater transparency would increase the benefits from procedural flexibility. Overall, a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending, and increase high-quality outlays.

Budget deficits -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Monetary policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Structural adjustment (Economic policy) -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Fiscal Policy --- Institutions and the Macroeconomy --- General Aggregative Models: General --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Structural reforms --- National accounts --- Fiscal policy --- Expenditure --- Fiscal governance --- National income --- Expenditures, Public --- Germany --- Monetary policy --- Budget deficits --- Structural adjustment (Economic policy) --- Econometric models.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is central to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. Initiated by Germany in 1995 and adopted in 1997, it regulates the fiscal policies of European Union Member States. Following numerous violations of its deficit reference value, the Pact's Excessive Deficit Procedure was suspended in 2003. The decision to suspend was brought before the European Court of Justice in 2004 and the SGP then underwent painstaking reform in 2005. After a period of economic prosperity and falling budgetary deficits, the global economic crisis put the system under renewed stress. Ruling Europe presents a comprehensive analysis of the political history of the SGP as the cornerstone of EMU. It examines the SGP through different theoretical lenses, offering a fascinating study of European integration and institutional design. One cannot understand the Euro without first understanding the SGP.

Money. Monetary policy --- European Union --- Fiscal policy --- Monetary policy --- Politique fiscale --- Politique monétaire --- European Union countries --- Pays de l'Union européenne --- Economic integration. --- Intégration économique --- Economic integration --- EEC / European Union - EU -Europese Unie - Union Européenne - UE --- 334.151.20 --- 331.31 --- 336.451 --- -339.5094 --- Ui1 --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Economische en monetaire unie van de Europese Gemeenschappen: algemeenheden. --- Economisch beleid. --- Begrotingsjaren en begrotingsstaten. Rijksmiddelenbegroting. Begrotingstekort. --- Politique monétaire --- Pays de l'Union européenne --- Intégration économique --- 339.5094 --- Economisch beleid --- Economische en monetaire unie van de Europese Gemeenschappen: algemeenheden --- Begrotingsjaren en begrotingsstaten. Rijksmiddelenbegroting. Begrotingstekort --- Social Sciences --- Political Science --- Fiscal policy - European Union countries --- Monetary policy - European Union countries --- European Union countries - Economic integration --- Pacte de stabilité et de croissance (1997) --- Union économique et monétaire --- Stabilisation économique --- Développement économique

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The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.

Budget -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Elections -- Economic aspects -- European Union countries. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Political Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Public Finance --- Budget --- Fiscal policy --- Elections --- Econometric models. --- Economic aspects --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Polls --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Budgeting --- Government policy --- Political science --- Politics, Practical --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- Economic policy --- Finance, Public --- Expenditures, Public --- Forecasting --- Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General --- Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General --- National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Fiscal Policy --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Budgeting & financial management --- Public finance & taxation --- Labour --- income economics --- Budget planning and preparation --- Expenditure --- Fiscal stance --- Public debt --- Unemployment rate --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Debts, Public --- Unemployment --- Poland, Republic of --- Income economics

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This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.

EEC / European Union - EU -Europese Unie - Union Européenne - UE --- 336.401 --- 331.31 --- Fiscal policy --- -Finance, Public --- -Budget --- -Fiscal policy --- -339.52094 --- Budgeting --- Expenditures, Public --- Finance, Public --- Cameralistics --- Public finance --- Currency question --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Economic policy --- Verband tussen begrotingspolitiek en economische evolutie. --- Economisch beleid. --- Forecasting --- Government policy --- Budget --- Economic policy and planning (general) --- Europe --- Business --- Welfare state --- Affaires --- Politique fiscale --- Finances publiques --- Etat providence --- European Union countries --- Pays de l'Union européenne --- Economic conditions --- Conditions économiques --- 339.52094 --- EEC / European Union - EU -Europese Unie - Union Européenne - UE --- Public finances --- Economisch beleid --- Verband tussen begrotingspolitiek en economische evolutie --- Social Sciences --- Political Science --- Fiscal policy - European Union countries --- Finance, Public - European Union countries --- Budget - European Union countries --- Fiscal policy - Europe --- Finance, Public - Europe --- Budget - Europe