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This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. The paper finds evidence of a significant positive correlation between parent banks' and foreign subsidiaries' default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have higher capital, retail deposit funding, and profitability ratios and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country regulations also influence the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries' default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of the subsidiary and the parent is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements and tougher restrictions on bank activities.

Access to Finance --- Bank Subsidiaries --- Banking Crises --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Corporate Law --- Debt Markets --- Default Risk --- Distance to Default --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Law and Development --- Merton Model --- Ring-Fencing

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Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, they examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. They find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, with generous deposit insurance and greater government ownership of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak investor protections, generous safety nets, and where the authorities provide limited guidance for bank asset diversification.

Access to Finance --- Bank competition --- Bank concentration --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credit risk --- Debt Markets --- Default risk --- Distance to default --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Lerner index --- Merton model --- Private Sector Development --- Systemic risk