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This paper documents that the spread of communism in China was partly caused by state failures in the early 20th century. It finds that famines became more frequent after China fell into warlord fragmentation, especially for prefectures with less rugged borders and those facing stronger military threat. The relation between topography and famines holds when using historical border changes to instrument border ruggedness. More people from famine-inflicted prefectures died in the subsequent decades for the communist movement, but not for the Nationalist Army. There is evidence that famines exacerbated rural inequality, which pushed more peasants to the side of the communists.

Agriculture --- Armed Conflict --- Communism --- Conflict and Development --- Famine --- Food Security --- Geography --- Governance --- Inequality --- National Governance --- State Failure --- Warlord

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The Lake Chad Region (LCR) is an economically interdependent area that encompasses parts of Cameroon (Extreme-Nord), Chad (Chari Baguirmi, Hadjer Lamis, Kenam, and Lac), Niger (Diffa and Zinder), and Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe). The region is characterized by strong historical, ethnic, cultural, and political ties, as well as commercial linkages that extend across its porous borders. Indeed, many if not most of the cross-border exchanges are not recorded in official import and export statistics. Informal trade is widespread throughout Africa (Bouet, Pace, and Glauber 2018; World Bank 2020), particularly if formal state institutions are under stress. Traders try to avoid import or export declarations as well as border taxes, and customs and other border agencies often tolerate the cross-border trade of small consignments without the need to comply with formal procedures. This does not necessarily mean that these trade flows go untaxed, though. Border officials might levy fees that do not have a legal basis, and state or local authorities often ask for informal payments at roadblocks or in marketplaces. The LCR is far from a seaport and, hence, heavily landlocked. This condition means that the cost of connecting to international markets is high. As a result, consumers in the LCR pay a high price for imports from global markets, whereas producers in the region get a low price for their exports to international clients. The region faces other challenges that stress its production base and depress economic development. These challenges include erratic weather patterns with frequent periods of drought, as well as environmental degradation of the lake. The most important threat to the well-being and the livelihood of the population in recent years has been the deteriorating security situation, though.

Access To Markets --- Agricultural Trade --- Agriculture --- Armed Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- International Trade and Trade Rules --- Trade Liberalization

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The Arab Spring protests marked the beginning of a new era in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011. Minor public protests began almost immediately after the initial protests in Cairo in January 2011. The first large demonstrations began two months later in March, and the following months saw a process of escalation as demonstrations spread and increased in size within the country. By the summer of 2011, the armed conflict was already unfolding. Now in its sixth year, the Syrian conflict remains active and is bringing much pain and tragedy on a daily basis. This study provides an assessment of the conflict's impact on economic and social outcomes in Syria as of early 2017. The analysis focuses on taking stock of the effects of the conflict in four areas: (i) physical damage, (ii) loss of lives and demographic dispersion, (iii) economic outcomes, and (iv) human development outcomes.

Armed Conflict --- Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- Demographics --- Economic Conditions and Volatility --- Human Migrations & Resettlements --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Migration --- Poverty Reduction --- Public Debt --- Refugees

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This paper studies the relationship between conflict and household welfare by using a detailed panel data set of household victimization across the most conflict-affected regions in Nigeria between 2010 and 2017, during a time characterized by a sharp increase in conflict. The North East region has been hardest hit with the recent Boko Haram insurgency. The North Central region has seen clashes between herders and farmers over land and resources. Several militant groups operate in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, where their aim is to extract resources by disrupting oil production. By exploiting the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing, intensity, and spatial distribution of victimization, this study finds that becoming a victim of conflict leads to higher food insecurity and decreased consumption. Since different types of actors have different motivations for their actions, the consequences of victimization might vary depending on the perpetrator. The study finds that events perpetrated by insurgents are the most detrimental to consumption, whereas food insecurity increases as a consequence of insurgent and criminal activity. This is in line with the results being strongest in the North East, which also has the highest intensity of conflict. The study also finds that property-related events are more detrimental to consumption and food insecurity than are violent events. Likewise, it finds suggestive evidence that violent events, as well as events perpetrated by insurgents and bandits, are detrimental to mental health. The findings highlight the importance of collecting nuanced information on victimization in conflict-affected areas.

Armed Conflict --- Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- Consumption --- Food Security --- Insurgency --- Living Standards --- Mental Health --- Poverty Reduction --- Psychology --- Social Conflict and Violence --- Social Development --- Victimization --- Violence

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Previous research proposes that peace is more likely to become durable if all rebel groups are included in the settlement reached. The argument implies that if actors are excluded and continue to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article argues that all-inclusive peace deals - signed by the government and all rebel groups - are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should anticipate that the excluded parties may continue to fight. Therefore, the risk of violent challenges from outside actors is likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, and so does not affect their commitment to peace. Implications from this theoretical argument are tested using unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel groups in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. The results are well in line with the theoretical expectations and show that whether an agreement leaves out some actor does not affect whether the signatories stick to peace. The results demonstrate that even when excluded rebel groups engage in conflict, this does not affect the signatories' commitment to peace. Hence, the findings suggest that partial peace is possible.

Armed conflict --- Armed conflicts --- Civil War --- Civil wars --- Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- Conflict Research --- Peace --- Peace agreements --- Peace and Peacekeeping --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Post Conflict Reintegration --- Rebel --- Violence