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In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four, with one subject randomly selected to be the "policymaker", while the other three are the "citizens". Citizens are informed that they can use their endowments to contribute to a group account. Any amount contributed to the group account are doubled. Once citizens have made their contribution decisions, the policymaker observes the contribution decisions of each citizen, and the total amount in the group account. The policymaker formulates a distribution "policy" to distribute the tokens among all four group members. The game is repeated for 20 rounds. With this basic framework, the authors implement and test the effect of three institutions designed to constrain policymaker rent-seeking behaviour: voting, policy commitment, and punishment. The results show that voting and enforced commitment are the most effective policy mechanisms to constrain rent-seeking, and improve citizen welfare. The authors find policymaker punishment regimes to be largely ineffective, both in reducing rent-seeking and improving welfare of citizens.

Finance --- Game theory --- Governance --- National Governance --- Politics and Government --- Voting

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Does online voting mobilize citizens who otherwise would not participate? During the annual participatory budgeting vote in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil-the world's largest-Internet voters were asked whether they would have participated had there not been an online voting option (i-voting). The study documents an 8.2 percent increase in total turn-out with the introduction of i-voting. In support of the mobilization hypothesis, unique survey data show that i-voting is mainly used by new participants rather than just for convenience by those who were already mobilized. The study also finds that age, gender, income, education, and social media usage are significant predictors of being online-only voters. Technology appears more likely to engage people who are younger, male, of higher income and educational attainment, and more frequent social media users.

Digital Divide --- ICT Policy and Strategies --- Internet --- National Governance --- Parliamentary Government --- Participation --- Participatory Budgeting --- Technology Industry --- Voting

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Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, non-dictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

Voting --- Social choice --- Probabilities --- Voting - Mathematical models --- Social choice - Mathematical models --- Probabilities - Mathematical models --- Arrow, Kenneth Joseph, - 1921-2017 --- Voting. --- Social choice. --- Probabilities. --- Mathematical models. --- Balloting --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Suffrage --- Probability --- Statistical inference --- Combinations --- Mathematics --- Chance --- Least squares --- Mathematical statistics --- Risk --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics

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The paper estimates the effects on presidential election returns in Mexico of a government climatic contingency transfer that is allocated through rainfall-indexed insurance. The analysis uses the discontinuity in payments that slightly deviate from a pre-established threshold, based on rainfall accumulation measured at local weather stations. It turns out that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering drought relief compensation. The paper finds that receiving indemnity payments leads to significantly greater average electoral support for the incumbent party of approximately 7.6 percentage points. The analysis suggests that the incumbent party is rewarded by disaster aid recipients and punished by non-recipients. The paper contributes to the literature on retrospective voting by providing evidence that voters evaluate government actions and respond to disaster spending.

Disaster Spending --- Environment --- Global Environment Facility --- Hazard Risk Management --- Industry --- Natural Disasters --- Political Accountability --- Poverty Reduction --- Regression Discontinuity --- Rural Poverty Reduction --- Technology Industry --- Urban Development --- Voting

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Administration [Public ] --- Administration publique --- Bestuurlijke organisatie --- Opérations de vote --- Organisatie [Bestuurlijke ] --- Parties [Political ] --- Partijen [Politieke ] --- Partis politiques --- Political parties --- Politieke partijen --- Public administration --- Scrutin --- Secret de vote --- Stemmen (Politiek) --- Sécurité de vote --- Vote --- Vote secret --- Votes --- Voting --- Élections--Modalités --- Public administration. --- Voting. --- Political parties. --- Administration publique (Science) --- Démocratie --- Aspect économique --- AA / International- internationaal --- 321.4 --- Democratie. --- Democracy --- Economic aspects --- Aspect économique. --- Democratie