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"In conflict-affected regions, delays in international response can have life or death consequences. The speed with which international organizations react to crises affects the prospects for communities to re-establish peace. Why then do some international organizations take longer than others to answer calls for intervention? To answer this question and explore options for reform, this book builds on contemporary scholarship by providing an original database on response rates and interview evidence from 50 ambassadors across four leading organizations (AU, EU, OAS and OSCE). The explanation for variation in speed ultimately lies in core differences in institutional cultures across organizations. Although wealth and capabilities can strengthen a peace operation, it is the unspoken rules and social networks at organizations' peace and security committees that dictate the pace with which an operation is established. This book offers a first analysis of the timeliness of international organizations in crisis response"-- "In conflict-affected regions, delays in international response can have life or death consequences. The speed with which international organizations react to crises affects the prospects for communities to re-establish peace. Why then do some international organizations take longer than others to answer calls for intervention? To answer this question and explore options for reform, Time to React builds on contemporary scholarship with original data on response rates and interview evidence from 50 ambassadors across four leading organizations (AU, EU, OAS and OSCE). The explanation for variation in speed ultimately lies in core differences in institutional cultures across organizations. Although wealth and capabilities can strengthen a peace operation, it is the unspoken rules and social networks of peace and security committees at these organizations that dictate the pace with which an operation is established. This book offers a first analysis of the critical importance of and conditions shaping timeliness of crisis response by international organizations"--
Crisis management --- Conflict management --- International agencies --- Gestion de crise --- Gestion des conflits --- Organisations internationales --- Crisis management. --- Conflict management. --- International agencies. --- #SBIB:327.7H01 --- #SBIB:327.5H00 --- Associations, International --- IGOs (Intergovernmental organizations) --- Institutions, International --- Intergovernmental organizations --- International administration --- International associations --- International governmental organizations --- International institutions --- International organizations --- International unions --- Organizations, International --- Specialized agencies of the United Nations --- International cooperation --- Interorganizational relations --- Non-state actors (International relations) --- International organization --- Conflict control --- Conflict resolution --- Dispute settlement --- Management of conflict --- Managing conflict --- Management --- Negotiation --- Problem solving --- Social conflict --- Crises --- Management of crises --- Grondslagen, principes, evolutie internationale gemeenschap --- Strategie en vredesonderzoek: algemeen --- Conflict managementGrondslagen, principes, evolutie internationale gemeenschap --- Inter-governmental organizations
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How and why do international organizations develop institutional memory from strategic errors ? As the author shows, formal learning processes, ironically, can deter elite officials from sharing their knowledge within the organizations at which they work. Elites have few professional incentives to report failures. Consequently, most memory-building occurs behind the scenes via informal processes, including transnational interpersonal networks. The author rests her argument through extensive, original field research inside one of the world's largest crisis management organizations - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). She conducted interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites, including almost all NATO ambassadors and military representatives, all assistant secretary generals, and other civilian and military leaders engaged in crisis management decision-making and planning. The author's findings provide insights into NATO's institutional memory of three cases of crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine. She argues that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for organizational learning, and she offers recommendations for how international organizations can preserve memory and learn from it, particularly in times of crisis.
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