Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper examines how schools choose class size and how households sort in response to those choices. Focusing on the highly liberalized Chilean education market, we develop a model in which schools are heterogeneous in an underlying productivity parameter, class size is a component of school quality, households are heterogeneous in income and hence willingness to pay for school quality, and schools are subject to a class-size cap. The model offers an explanation for two distinct empirical patterns observed among private schools that accept government vouchers: (i) There is an inverted-U relationship between class size and household income in equilibrium, which will tend to bias cross-sectional estimates of the effect of class size on student performance. (ii) Some schools at the class size cap adjust prices (or enrollments) to avoid adding another classroom, which produces stacking at enrollments that are multiples of the class size cap. This generates discontinuities in the relationship between enrollment and household characteristics at those points, violating the assumptions underlying regression-discontinuity (RD) research designs. This result suggests that caution is warranted in applying the RD approach in settings in which parents have substantial school choice and schools are free to set prices and influence their enrollments.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

A growing body of research suggests that difficulties in collecting taxes are an important constraint on economic performance in developing countries. Evidence from rich countries points to third- party reporting -- in particular, employer reports of employees' wages -- as a potential remedy. To what extent does the accuracy of third-party reporting carry over to developing countries, with their weaker enforcement regimes? In this paper, we compare two sources of wage information from Mexico -- firms' reports of individuals' wages to the Mexican social security agency and individuals' responses to a household labor-force survey -- to investigate the extent of wage under-reporting by formal firms and how it responded to an important change in the social security system. We document that under-reporting is extensive, and that compliance is better in larger firms. Using a difference-in-differences strategy based on the 1997 Mexican pension reform, which effectively tied pension benefits more closely to reported wages for younger workers than for older workers, we show that the reform led to a relative decline in under-reporting for younger age groups. This result reinforces the view that the discrepancies between the two data sources can be interpreted as evidence of evasion, and suggests that giving employees incentives and information to improve the accuracy of employer reports can be an effective way to improve payroll-tax compliance.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper develops a new method for estimating production-function parameters that can be applied in differentiated-product industries with endogenous quality and variety choice. We take advantage of data on physical quantities of outputs and inputs from the Colombian manufacturing survey, focusing on producers of rubber and plastic products. Assuming constant elasticities of substitution of outputs and inputs within firms, we aggregate from the firm-product to the firm level and show how quality and variety choices may bias standard estimators. Using real exchange rates and variation in the "bite" of the national minimum wage, we construct external instruments for materials and labor choices. We implement a simple two-step instrumental-variables method, first estimating a difference equation to recover the materials and labor coefficients and then estimating a levels equation to recover the capital coefficient. Under the assumption that the instruments are uncorrelated with firms' quality and variety choices, this method yields consistent estimates, free of the quality and variety biases we have identified. Our point estimates differ from those of existing methods and changes in our preferred productivity estimator perform relatively well in predicting future export growth.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper studies technology adoption in a cluster of soccer-ball producers in Sialkot, Pakistan. We invented a new cutting technology that reduces waste of the primary raw material and gave the technology to a random subset of producers. Despite the clear net benefits for nearly all firms, after 15 months take-up remained puzzlingly low. We hypothesize that an important reason for the lack of adoption is a misalignment of incentives within firms: the key employees (cutters and printers) are typically paid piece rates, with no incentive to reduce waste, and the new technology slows them down, at least initially. Fearing reductions in their effective wage, employees resist adoption in various ways, including by misinforming owners about the value of the technology. To investigate this hypothesis, we implemented a second experiment among the firms that originally received the technology: we offered one cutter and one printer per firm a lump-sum payment, approximately a month's earnings, conditional on demonstrating competence in using the technology in the presence of the owner. This incentive payment, small from the point of view of the firm, had a significant positive effect on adoption. The results suggest that misalignment of incentives within firms is an important barrier to technology adoption in our setting.