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"Attempts to present a systematic discussion of the major benefits and costs of occupational licensing to the economies of the United States and several European countries."

BUSINESS & ECONOMICS --- Economics / General --- Professions --- Occupations --- Quality assurance --- Licenses --- Quality control --- Career patterns --- Careers --- Jobs --- Trades --- Vocational guidance --- Work --- Professional services --- Interprofessional relations --- Competition --- #SBIB:316.334.2A470 --- Arbeidssociologie: het sociaal-economisch overheidsbeleid: algemeen --- License agreements. --- Agreements, Licensing --- Intellectual property licenses --- Joint-venture agreements --- License agreements --- Licensing agreements --- Contracts --- Industrial property --- Intangible property --- Law and legislation

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The goal of this paper is to examine the implied penalty policies underlying the remedies created by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in terms of the policies' impact on employer and union behaviors. We present a simple model of deterrence as a means of evaluating workplace penalty policies in terms of their influence on employer behavior, particularly through deterrence effects. We also compare the remedies for violations embodied in the NLRA with penalty policies under other workplace legislation, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. We then evaluate the size of financial costs for violations against individuals of specific provisions of the NLRA by firms and unions for the period 2000-2009. We show that the implied penalties are modest, particularly in terms of providing sufficient incentives to comply with the law in a timely manner. Given this finding, we examine other potential remedies available under the NLRA, in particular, methods to address the impact of delays (the length of time from the filing of the charge or the issuance of the charge to the time of its adjudication before an administrative law judge at the National Labor Relations Board or through the federal courts) on workplace representation through unionization.

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The impact of government social and labor market institutions on economic outcomes have generated a great deal of attention by economists and policymakers in the U.S. and in other nations. The theoretical model suggests that there are trade offs of higher levels of economic outcomes with more equity-producing labor market institutions. This study examines the impact of national levels of unionization, strike levels, public policies toward labor, and the structure of collective bargaining within a nation on a country's foreign direct investment (FDI). As an additional test of the relationship of labor market institutions and state labor market policies and economic outcomes, we examine the empirical relationship with the economic growth of U.S. states. Examining 20 OECD nations from 1985 through 1995 and all U.S. states from 1990 to 1999, our statistical analysis shows that higher levels of industrial relations institutions are usually associated with lower levels of FDI and slower economic growth for U.S. states. However, within the context of the model the results do not necessarily suggest that a nation or state would be better off trading social equity through fewer restrictive industrial relations institutions for higher levels of economic growth.

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Recent estimates in standard models of wage determination for both unionization and occupational licensing have shown wage effects that are similar across the two institutions. These cross-sectional estimates use specialized data sets, with small sample sizes, for the period 2006 through 2008. Our analysis examines the impact of unions and licensing coverage on wage determination using new data collected on licensing statutes that are then linked to longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) from 1979 to 2010. We develop several approaches, using both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, to measure the impact of these two labor market institutions on wage determination. Our estimates of the economic returns to union coverage are greater than those for licensing requirements.

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We show that occupational licensing has significant negative effects on labor market fluidity defined as cross-occupation mobility. Using a balanced panel of workers constructed from the CPS and SIPP data, we analyze the link between occupational licensing and labor market outcomes. We find that workers with a government-issued occupational license experience churn rates significantly lower than those of non-licensed workers. Specifically, licensed workers are 24% less likely to switch occupations and 3% less likely to become unemployed in the following year. Moreover, occupational licensing represents barriers to entry for both non-employed workers and employed ones. The effect is more prominent for employed workers relative to those entering from nonemployment, because the opportunity cost of acquiring a license is much higher for employed individuals. Lastly, we find that average wage growth is higher for licensed workers than non-licensed workers, whether they stay in the same occupation in the next year or switch occupations. We find significant heterogeneity in the licensing effect across different occupation groups. These results hold across various data sources, time spans, and indicators of being licensed. Overall, licensing could account for almost 8% of the total decline in monthly occupational mobility over the past two decades.