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This paper develops a politico-economic model for use in studying the role of intra-elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country's political regime, trade policy and income-tax-based redistribution scheme. Three socioeconomic groups are involved: two elite groups and workers, whose preferences regarding trade policy and income taxation are derived from a simple open-economy model. The critical point is that income taxation induces a rich-poor/elite-workers political cleavage, while trade policy opens the door to intra-elite conflict. In this model, when there is no intra-elite conflict, changes in trade policy are associated with political transitions. Coups (democratizations) open up the economy if and only if both elite factions are pro-free-trade (protectionist). However, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade their policy and reallocating political power within the elite (to the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers) rather than offering to democratize the country. The change in trade policy is credible because the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers controls the autocracy. Moreover, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, coups tend to result in the maintenance of the existing trade policy unless popular demands are extremely radical and/or the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers is exceptionally weak.
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In the last years, several countries implemented policy interventions to entitle urban squatters, encouraged by the results of studies showing large welfare gains from entitlement. We study a natural experiment in the allocation of land titles to very poor families in a suburban area of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Although previous studies on this experiment have found important effects of titling on investment, household structure, educational achievement, and child health, in this article we document that a large fraction of households that went through a situation at which formalization was challenged (death, divorce, sale/purchase), ended up being de-regularized. The legal costs of remaining formal seem too high relative to the value of these parcels and the income of their inhabitants.
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We discuss the past, present and future of the structural approach in empirical microeconomics, starting with its inception in the 1970s and 1980s. Our focus is on the use of the structural approach in labor economics, broadly defined to include population economics, human capital and related fields. In the hopes to reach a wider audience that might not be as familiar with the pillars of the structural approach, we first provide an overview of well-known features, setting the stage for a more up-to-date discussion of current developments. We discuss how to identify the need for a structural model, and key steps involved in how to formulate one. We also discuss issues of identification and estimation and highlight advantages and disadvantages of this approach, including the controversial issue of external validity. We then describe the current frontier of this approach, which increasingly reflects integration efforts with "design-based" strategies. This integration provides opportunities to both, validate structural models and enhance the credibility of their identification. We highlight why, whenever possible, it is best to pursue both of these goals, reserving some of the credible exogenous variation for identification and some for validation. While quasi-experimental variation can be useful in pursuit of both of these goals, we discuss why RCTs provide a first best opportunity in terms of out-of-sample validation. We conclude with thoughts about the future of the structural approach.
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This paper provides experimental evidence on the effect of increased competition on prices and quality in the retail sector. We randomized the entry of 61 firms into 72 markets serving the beneficiaries of a conditional cash transfer program in the Dominican Republic. Six months after the intervention entry into the market led to reductions in prices ranging from 2 to 6 percent and to a statistically significant improvement in self-reported service quality. Prices dropped more in areas where the number of entrants was larger. Competition seems to have driven part of the clientele away from incumbent retailers.
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We explore the political economy of trade and migration policies in several models of international trade. We show that in a Ricardian world, free trade and no international labor mobility is a Nash equilibrium outcome, but free trade and free international labor mobility is not. The result holds under different assumptions about the set of goods, preferences and the number of countries. An analogous result also holds in multifactor economies such as: a version of the standard two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Ricardo-Vinner specific factors model, and a three-sector model with a non-tradeable sector. We also study three extensions of our model in which free trade and at least partial labor mobility is a Nash equilibrium outcome. One extension introduces increasing returns to scale. Another an extractive elite. Finally, we allow the recipient country to charge an immigration fee in the form of an income tax and distribute the proceeds among domestic workers, which induces a Pareto improvement for the global economy.
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In designing any causal study, steps must be taken to address both internal and external threats to its validity. Researchers tend to focus primarily on dealing with threats to internal validity. However, once they have conducted an internally valid analysis, that analysis yields an established set of findings for the specific case in question. As for the future usefulness of that result, however, what matters is its degree of external validity. In this paper we provide a formal, general exploration of the question of external validity and propose a simple and generally applicable method for evaluating the external validity of randomized controlled trials. Although our method applies only to RCTs, the issue of external validity is general and not restricted to RCTs, as shown in our formal analysis.
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We review, from a practical standpoint, the evolving literature on assessing external validity (EV) of estimated treatment effects. We review existing EV measures, and focus on methods that permit multiple datasets (Hotz et al., 2005). We outline criteria for practical usage, evaluate the existing approaches, and identify a gap in potential methods. Our practical considerations motivate a novel method utilizing the Group Lasso (Yuan and Lin, 2006) to estimate a tractable regression-based model of the conditional average treatment effect (CATE). This approach can perform better when settings have differing covariate distributions and allows for easily extrapolating the average treatment effect to new settings. We apply these measures to a set of identical field experiments upgrading slum dwellings in three different countries (Galiani et al., 2017).
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Why did the most prosperous colonies in the British Empire mount a rebellion? Even more puzzling, why didn't the British agree to have American representation in Parliament and quickly settle the dispute peacefully? At first glance, it would appear that a deal could have been reached to share the costs of the global public goods provided by the Empire in exchange for more political autonomy and/or formal representation for the colonies. (At least, this was the view of men of the time such as Lord Chapman, Thomas Pownall and Adam Smith.) We argue, however, that the incumbent government in Great Britain, controlled by the landed gentry, feared that giving political concessions to the colonies would undermine the position of the dominant coalition, strengthen the incipient democratic movement, and intensify social pressures for the reform of a political system based on land ownership. In particular, allowing Americans to be represented in Parliament was problematic because American elites could not credibly commit to refuse to form a coalition with the British opposition. Consequently, the only realistic options were to maintain the original colonial status or fight a full-scale war of independence.
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This article presents a comprehensive analysis of trends in the publication and citation of economics scholarly research, with a focus on specialization within fields of economics research (i.e., applied, applied theory, econometrics methods, and theory). We collected detailed data on 24,273 articles published from 1970 to 2016 in highly regarded general research economics journals. We then used state-of-the-art machine learning and natural language processing techniques to further enrich the collected data. Our findings reveal significant disparities in article content and citations across fields of economics research. The analysis indicates growing specialization trends in theory and econometric methods. In contrast, applied papers are covering a wider range of topics and receiving an increasing proportion of extramural citations over time. By 2016, applied ranked among the most or second most cited field by any other field of economics research. These patterns are consistent with applied papers becoming more multidisciplinary. Applied theory articles have also demonstrated a growing breadth of topics covered (similar to applied articles); however, this has not been accompanied by an increase in extramural citations or in the share of citations received from other fields of economics research (as observed with theory articles). This makes it challenging to determine their specialization status.
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Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world's societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain rents in the process of doing so. We experimentally explore the connections between the two. We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common-agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions using two experiments. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents, which is one of the theoretical predictions of the parametrized electoral and common-agency models that we have used.
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