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Financial globalization was off to a rocky start in emerging economies hit by Sudden Stops in the 1990s. The surge in foreign reserves since then is viewed as a New Merchantilism in which reserves are a war-chest for defense against Sudden Stops. We conduct a quantitative assessment of this argument using a framework in which precautionary savings affect foreign assets via business cycle volatility, financial globalization, and endogenous Sudden Stops. Our results show that financial globalization and Sudden Stop risk are plausible explanations of the surge in reserves but cyclical volatility, which has declined in the globalization period, is not.

Business cycles --- Equilibrium (Economics) --- Globalization. --- Mathematical models. --- Global cities --- Globalisation --- Internationalization --- International relations --- Anti-globalization movement --- Exports and Imports --- Macroeconomics --- Globalization --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- Macroeconomics: Consumption --- Saving --- Wealth --- Globalization: General --- International economics --- Foreign assets --- Sudden stops --- Precautionary savings --- Consumption --- Balance of payments --- External position --- National accounts --- Investments, Foreign --- Capital movements --- Saving and investment --- Economics --- Mexico

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Financial globalization was off to a rocky start in emerging economies hit by Sudden Stops since the mid 1990s. Foreign reserves grew very rapidly during this period, and hence it is often argued that we live in the era of a New Merchantilism in which large stocks of reserves are a war-chest for defense against Sudden Stops. We conduct a quantitative assessment of this argument using a stochastic intertemporal equilibrium framework with incomplete asset markets in which precautionary saving affects foreign assets via three mechanisms: business cycle volatility, financial globalization, and Sudden Stop risk. In this framework, Sudden Stops are an equilibrium outcome produced by an endogenous credit constraint that triggers Irving Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Our results show that financial globalization and Sudden Stop risk are plausible explanations of the observed surge in reserves but business cycle volatility is not. In fact, business cycle volatility has declined in the post-globalization period. These results hold whether we use the formulation of intertemporal preferences of the Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget class of precautionary savings models or the Uzawa-Epstein setup with endogenous time preference.

Equilibrium (Economics) --- Mathematical models.

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The globalization hazard hypothesis maintains that the current account reversals and asset price collapses observed during 'Sudden Stops' are caused by global capital market frictions. A policy implication of this view is that Sudden Stops can be prevented by offering global investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees, however, introduce a moral hazard incentive for global investors, thus creating a tradeoff by which price guarantees weaken globalization hazard but strengthen international moral hazard. This paper studies the quantitative implications of this tradeoff using a dynamic stochastic equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, distortions induced by margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by introducing a distortion that props up foreign demand for assets. Non-state-contingent guarantees contain Sudden Stops but they are executed often and induce persistent asset overvaluation. Guarantees offered only in high-debt states are executed rarely and prevent Sudden Stops without persistent asset overvaluation. If the elasticity of foreign asset demand is low, price guarantees can still contain Sudden Stops but domestic agents obtain smaller welfare gains at Sudden Stop states and suffer welfare losses on average in the stochastic steady state.

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The hypothesis that Sudden Stops to capital inflows in emerging economies may be caused by global capital market frictions, such as collateral constraints and trading costs, suggests that Sudden Stops could be prevented by offering price guarantees on the emerging-markets asset class. Providing these guarantees is a risky endeavor, however, because they introduce a moral-hazard-like incentive similar to those that are also viewed as a cause of emerging markets crises. This paper studies this financial frictions-moral hazard tradeoff using an equilibrium asset-pricing model in which margin constraints, trading costs, and ex-ante price guarantees interact in the determination of asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics. In the absence of guarantees, margin calls and trading costs create distortions that produce Sudden Stops driven by occasionally binding credit constraints and Irving Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism. Price guarantees contain the asset deflation by creating another distortion that props up the foreign investors' demand for emerging markets assets. Quantitative simulation analysis shows the strong interaction of these two distortions in driving the dynamics of asset prices, consumption and the current account. Price guarantees are found to be effective for containing Sudden Stops but at the cost of introducing potentially large distortions that could lead to 'overvaluation' of emerging markets assets.