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This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrow’s Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to influence processes and information sharing in collective decision making networks; from cardinal utility to restricted domains for social welfare functions; from rights and game forms to responsibility in committee decision making; and from dueling to bargaining. The book reflects the richness and diversity of the field of collective decision making and shows the usefulness and adequacy of social choice and game theory for the study of it. It starts with typical social choice themes like Arrow’s Theorem and ends with typical game theoretical topics, like bargaining and interval games. In between there is a mixture of views on collective decision making in which both social choice and game theoretic aspects are brought in. The book is dedicated to Harrie de Swart, who organized the well-known Social Choice Colloquia at the University of Tilburg in the Netherlands.

Economics/Management Science. --- Economic Theory. --- Public Finance & Economics. --- Economics. --- Finance. --- Economie politique --- Finances --- Group decision making --- Social choice --- Game theory --- Mathematical models --- Game theory. --- Group decision making -- Mathematical models. --- Social choice. --- Sociology & Social History --- Business & Economics --- Social Sciences --- Economic Theory --- Social Change --- Decision making. --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Decision making --- Economic theory. --- Public finance. --- Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. --- Public Economics. --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics --- Problem solving --- Cameralistics --- Public finance --- Currency question --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man --- Public finances --- Group decision making - Mathematical models

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City planning. --- City planning --- Social choice. --- Choice, Social --- Collective choice --- Public choice --- Choice (Psychology) --- Social psychology --- Welfare economics --- Cities and towns --- Civic planning --- Land use, Urban --- Model cities --- Redevelopment, Urban --- Slum clearance --- Town planning --- Urban design --- Urban development --- Urban planning --- Land use --- Planning --- Art, Municipal --- Civic improvement --- Regional planning --- Urban policy --- Urban renewal --- Evaluation. --- Government policy --- Management --- Stedenbouw --- Ruimtelijke ordening --- Planologie

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In economics agents are assumed to choose on the basis of rational calculations aimed at the maximization of their pleasure or profit. Formally, agents are said to manifest transitive and consistent preferences in attempting to maximize their utility in the presence of several constraints. They operate according to the choice imperative: given a set of alternatives, choose the best. This imperative works well in a static and simplistic framework, but it may fail or vary when 'the best' is changing continuously. This approach has been questioned by a descriptive approach that springing from the complexity theory tries to give a scientific basis to the way in which individuals really choose, showing that those models of human nature is routinely falsified by experiments since people are neither selfish nor rational. Thus inductive rules of thumb are usually implemented in order to make decisions in the presence of incomplete and heterogeneous information sets; errors and biases are the natural counterpart of learning and adapting processes. The papers collected in this volume show that economic agents, individual or aggregate, do not conform to standard economic models, highlighting how a different framework - complexity theory - could help to explain and understand the choice and decision process of economic agent.

Mathematics. --- Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. --- Complex Networks. --- Economic Systems. --- Economics. --- Mathématiques --- Economie politique --- AA / International- internationaal --- 305.6 --- Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen. --- Consumer behavior --- Decision making --- Economics --- Econophysics --- Finance, Personal --- Financial risk management --- Rational choice theory --- Risk --- Deciding --- Decision (Psychology) --- Decision analysis --- Decision processes --- Making decisions --- Management --- Management decisions --- Choice (Psychology) --- Problem solving --- Behavior, Consumer --- Buyer behavior --- Decision making, Consumer --- Human behavior --- Consumer profiling --- Market surveys --- Behavioral economics --- Behavioural economics --- Uncertainty --- Probabilities --- Profit --- Risk-return relationships --- Social choice --- Risk management --- Financial management, Personal --- Financial planning, Personal --- Personal finance --- Personal financial management --- Personal financial planning --- Finance --- Financial literacy --- Statistical physics --- Economic statistics --- Econometrics --- Economic sociology --- Socio-economics --- Socioeconomics --- Sociology of economics --- Sociology --- Psychological aspects --- Social aspects --- Methodology --- Philosophy --- Sociological aspects --- Statistical methods --- Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen --- Planning