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This paper assesses the competition among retail banking institutions in Norway using data for the period 2000-2005. I investigate two questions regarding the nature of the competition. First, I estimate an equilibrium market structure model that endogenizes the banks' entry decisions of two possible types: savings banks and commercial banks. By using the observed market structure and a game-theoretic specification of the banks entry behavior, I identify the parameters in an underlying profit function. Second, I estimate a dynamic entry model taking sunk costs into account. The results indicate that there are strong competitive effects between the two types, however, I can not reject that they in fact compete as homogeneous firms. Furthermore, the results of the dynamic model indicates that sunk entry costs plays an important role in the banks' entry decisions and that competition intensifies with entry.