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Digital
Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement
Authors: ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.


Digital
Experts and Their Records
Authors: ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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Consider an environment where long-lived experts repeatedly interact with short-lived customers. In periods when an expert is hired, she chooses between providing a profitable major treatment or a less profitable minor treatment. The expert has private information about which treatment best serves the customer, but has no direct incentive to act in the customer's interest. Customers can observe the past record of each expert's actions, but never learn which actions would have been appropriate. We find that there exists an equilibrium in which experts always play truthfully and choose the customer's preferred treatment. The expert is rewarded for choosing the less profitable action with future business: customers return to an expert with high probability if the previous treatment was minor, and low probability if it was major. If experts have private information regarding their own payoffs as well as what treatments are appropriate, then there is no equilibrium with truthful play in every period. But we construct equilibria where experts are truthful arbitrarily often as their discount factor converges to one.


Digital
Half a Century of Public Software Institutions: Open Source as a Solution to Hold-Up Problem
Authors: ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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We argue that the intrinsic inefficiency of proprietary software has historically created a space for alternative institutions that provide software as a public good. We discuss several sources of such inefficiency, focusing on one that has not been described in the literature: the underinvestment due to fear of holdup. An inefficient holdup occurs when a user of software must make complementary investments, when the return on such investments depends on future cooperation of the software vendor, and when contracting about a future relationship with the software vendor is not feasible. We also consider how the nature of the production function of software makes software cheaper to develop when the code is open to the end users. Our framework explains why open source dominates certain sectors of the software industry (e.g., the top ten programming languages all have an open source implementation), while being almost none existent in some other sectors (none of the top ten computer games are open source). We then use our discussion of efficiency to examine the history of institutions for provision of public software from the early collaborative projects of the 1950s to the modern "open source" software institutions. We look at how such institutions have created a sustainable coalition for provision of software as a public good by organizing diverse individual incentives, both altruistic and profit-seeking, providing open source products of tremendous commercial importance, which have come to dominate certain segments of the software industry.


Digital
Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?
Authors: ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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In this paper we study "investment tournaments," a class of decision problems that involve gradual allocation of investment among several alternatives whose values are subject to exogenous shocks. The decision-maker's payoff is determined by the final values of the alternatives. An important example of career tournaments motivating our research is the career choice problem, since a person choosing a career often starts by investing in learning several professions. We show that in a broad range of cases it is optimal for the decision-maker in each time period to allocate all resources to the most promising alternative. We also show that in tournaments for a promotion the agents would rationally put forth a higher effort in an early stage of the tournament in a bid to capture a larger share of employer's investment, such as mentoring.


Digital
Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars
Authors: ---
Year: 2018 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We study the interplay between autonomous transportation, carpooling, and road pricing. We discuss how improvements in these technologies, and interactions among them, will affect transportation markets. Our main results show how to achieve socially efficient outcomes in such markets, taking into account the costs of driving, road capacity, and commuter preferences. An important component of the efficient outcome is the socially optimal matching of carpooling riders. Our approach shows how to set road prices and how to share the costs of driving and tolls among carpooling riders in a way that implements the efficient outcome.


Digital
Perverse incentives in the Medicare prescription drug benefit
Authors: ---
Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. NBER

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Digital
Information disclosure and unraveling in matching markets
Authors: ---
Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass; NBER

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Digital
Median Stable Matching
Authors: ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it exists.


Digital
Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Authors: ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Agents may learn preferences over partners via costly interviews. Although there exist multiple equilibria where all agents receive the same number of interviews, efficiency depends on overlap -- the number of common interview partners among agents. We prove the equilibria with the highest degree of overlap yields the highest probability of being matched. The analysis suggests that institutions which ration interviews or create labor market segmentation may lead to greater efficiency in information acquisition activities.


Digital
Green Building : Guidebook for Sustainable Architecture
Authors: --- ---
ISBN: 9783642006357 9783642006524 9783642006340 9783662610589 Year: 2010 Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer

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An important consideration for energy-efficient buildings is their primary energy requirements over the entire life cycle. How to determine this? What integrative factors influence the performance of a healthy and sustainable building? This, while it may be important for clients and architects to know, is frequently not very transparent. This book has been written to assist with clarifying target criteria and expanding horizons when it comes to ecological buildings. It is meant as a handbook and source of reference for clients, architects, planners and building operators, to provide them with pertinent information about their design, construction and operation: how to do this in the most energy-efficient and economical manner? Also, there is feedback and documentation about prominent buildings like the Hamburg Dockland or the Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg in Stuttgart. They provide excellent architectural examples for detailed construction and design solutions. Further, there are insightful interviews with architects and clients about many important buildings, which help turn this book into an integrated source of reference for sustainable architecture. - A Guideline for Planning, Construction and Operation of sustainable Buildings - A source of reference for clients, architects, planners and building operators - Innovative architectural examples with sustainable concepts and design.

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