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Counterinsurgency has staked its claim in the new century as the new American way of war. Yet, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have revived a historical debate about the costs - monetary, political and moral - of operations designed to eliminate insurgents and build nations. Today's counterinsurgency proponents point to 'small wars' past to support their view that the enemy is 'biddable' if the correct tactical formulas are applied. Douglas Porch's sweeping history of counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the three 'providential nations' of France, Britain and the United States, ranging from nineteenth-century colonial conquests to General Petraeus' 'Surge' in Iraq, challenges the contemporary mythologising of counterinsurgency as a humane way of war. The reality, he reveals, is that 'hearts and minds' has never been a recipe for lasting stability and that past counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing societies while unsettling civil-military relations.

Counterinsurgency --- Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) --- Counterguerrilla warfare --- Guerrilla warfare --- Insurgency --- Conflicts, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Low-intensity operations (Military science) --- Low-level conflicts (Military science) --- Operations, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Small wars --- Wars, Small --- Limited war --- History.

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Cold War --- -Communist strategy --- Espionage --- -Ideology --- Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) --- Propaganda, International --- Security, International --- World politics --- -Collective security --- International security --- International relations --- Disarmament --- International organization --- Peace --- International propaganda --- Propaganda --- Conflicts, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Low-intensity operations (Military science) --- Low-level conflicts (Military science) --- Operations, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Small wars --- Wars, Small --- Limited war --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Political science --- Psychology --- Thought and thinking --- Strategy, Communist --- Communism --- Colonialism --- Global politics --- International politics --- Political history --- World history --- Eastern question --- Geopolitics --- Covert operations (Espionage) --- Operations, Undercover (Espionage) --- Spying --- Undercover operations (Espionage) --- Intelligence service --- Spies --- Psychological aspects --- History --- -#A0201H --- International groups --- -Colonialism --- Collective security --- -Conflicts, Low-intensity (Military science) --- -Strategy, Communist --- -Psychological aspects

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Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In Logics of War, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation's decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864-1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history. When leaders go to war expecting easy victory, events usually correct their misperceptions quickly and with fairly low casualties, thereby setting the stage for a negotiated agreement. A second explanation involves motives born of domestic politics; as war becomes more intense, however, leaders are increasingly constrained in their ability to continue the fighting. Particularly destructive wars instead arise from mistrust of an opponent's intentions. Countries that launch preventive wars to forestall expected decline tend to have particularly ambitious war aims that they hold to even when fighting goes poorly. Moreover, in some cases, their opponents interpret the preventive attack as evidence of a dispositional commitment to aggression, resulting in the rejection of any form of negotiation and a demand for unconditional surrender. Weisiger's treatment of a topic of central concern to scholars of major wars will also be read with great interest by military historians, political psychologists, and sociologists.

War --- Limited war. --- Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) --- Total war. --- Causes. --- Military policy --- Strategy --- Conflicts, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Low-intensity operations (Military science) --- Low-level conflicts (Military science) --- Operations, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Small wars --- Wars, Small --- Limited war --- Tactical nuclear weapons --- Causes of war

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Carl von Clausewitz has long been interpreted as the paradigmatic thinker of major interstate war. This book challenges this assumption by showing that Clausewitz was an ardent analyst of small war and integrated many aspects of his early writings on partisan warfare and people's war into his magnum opus, 'On War.' It reconstructs Clausewitz's intellectual development by placing it in the context of his engagement with the political and philosophical currents of his own times - German Idealism, Romanticism, and Humanism. The central question that Clausewitz and his contemporaries faced was how to defend Prussia and Europe against Napoleon's expansionist strategy.

Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) --- Clausewitz, Carl von, --- Criticism and interpretation. --- Conflicts, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Low-intensity operations (Military science) --- Low-level conflicts (Military science) --- Operations, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Small wars --- Wars, Small --- Limited war --- Klausewitz, Karl von, --- Klauzevit︠s︡, --- Von Clausewitz, Carl, --- Clausewitz, Karl von, --- Ḳlaʼuzvits, Ḳarl fun, --- קלאוזביץ --- Clausewitz, Carl Philipp Gottfried von,

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Low intensity conflicts (Military science) --- Tactics --- Military history, Modern --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Military Science - General --- Modern military history --- Military tactics --- Military art and science --- Conflicts, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Low-intensity operations (Military science) --- Low-level conflicts (Military science) --- Operations, Low-intensity (Military science) --- Small wars --- Wars, Small --- Limited war --- Tactics. --- Military history, Modern.