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No area of law and policy is more central to our well-being than housing, yet research on the topic is too often produced in disciplinary or methodological silos that fail to connect to policy on the ground. This pathbreaking book, which features leading scholars from a range of academic fields, cuts across disciplines to forge new connections in the discourse. In accessible prose filled with cutting-edge ideas, these scholars address topics ranging from the recent financial crisis to discrimination and gentrification and show how housing law and policy impacts household wealth, financial markets, urban landscapes, and local communities. Together, they harness evidence and theory to capture the 'state of play' in housing, generating insights that will be relevant to academics and policymakers alike. This title is also available as Open Access.

Housing --- Housing policy. --- Law and legislation. --- Housing and state --- State and housing --- City planning --- Social policy --- City planning and redevelopment law --- Government policy --- housing --- gentrification --- segregation --- redlining --- law and economics --- affordability --- property values --- mortgages --- urban planning --- land use

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In the U.S. mortgage market, private mortgage insurance (PMI) is mandated for high-leverage mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to serve as a private market check on GSE risk-taking. However, we document that PMI firms dramatically expanded insurance on high-risk mortgages at the tail-end of the housing boom, contradicting the industry's own research regarding house price risk. Using three detailed sources of mortgage and insurance data, we examine PMI application denial rates, default rates on PMI-backed loans, and growth rates of high-leverage lending around the GSE conforming loan limit, along with information extracted from company, industry and regulatory filings and reports. We conclude that PMI behavior during the housing boom in part reflects a "moral hazard" incentive inherent to insurance companies in general to underprice risk and be undercapitalized. Our results suggest that rather than providing discipline, private mortgage insurers facilitated GSE risk-taking.