Narrow your search

Library

UGent (4)

KU Leuven (3)

Odisee (2)

UAntwerpen (2)

VUB (2)

EhB (1)

LUCA School of Arts (1)

Thomas More Kempen (1)

Thomas More Mechelen (1)

UCLouvain (1)

More...

Resource type

book (10)


Language

English (10)


Year
From To Submit

2007 (3)

1986 (1)

1976 (6)

Listing 1 - 10 of 10
Sort by

Book
Thought-contents : on the ontology of belief and the semantics of belief attribution
Author:
ISBN: 1280726792 9786610726790 1402050852 Year: 2007 Volume: v. 104 Publisher: Dordrecht : Springer,

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one’s language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S’s non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief—a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell’s obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents.

Thought-contents : On the ontology of belief and the semantics of belief attribution.
Author:
ISBN: 9781402050848 1402050844 9048172802 9786610726790 1280726792 1402050852 Year: 2007 Publisher: Dordrecht Springer

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one's language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S's non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell's obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents.


Book
Thought-Contents : On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution
Authors: ---
ISBN: 9781402050855 Year: 2007 Publisher: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a "thought-content"), the latter being an "abstract" property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. One bears the belief-relation to a thought-content T just in case one (is disposed as one who) inwardly affirms a certain sentence S of one's language of thought that satisfies what T encodes, which in turn requires that S's non-logical parts stand in appropriate semantical relations to items specified by T. Since these items may include other senses as well as ordinary objects, beliefs of arbitrary complexity are automatically accommodated. Within the framework of the formal ontology, a context-dependent compositional semantics is then provided for a fragment of regimented English capable of formulating ascriptions of belief a semantics that treats substitutional opacity as a genuine semantic datum. Finally, the resulting picture of belief and its attribution is defended by showing how it solves standard puzzles, avoids objections to rival accounts, and satisfies certain adequacy conditions not fulfilled by traditional theories. Along the way, clarification and defense is offered for the ingredient conception of object-dependent senses, and it is shown how adoption of the language of thought hypothesis permits Bertrand Russell's obscure doctrine of logical forms to be understood in a way that not only vindicates his Multiple Relation theory of de re belief but also reveals the connection between these logical forms and thought-contents.


Book
The myth of semantic presupposition.
Authors: ---
Year: 1976 Publisher: Bloomington (Ind.) : Indiana University. Linguistics club,

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

Keywords


Book
Papers in nonphonology
Authors: ---
Year: 1976 Publisher: Columbus (Ohio) : Ohio State University. Department of linguistics,

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract


Book
The myth of semantic presupposition
Authors: ---
Year: 1976 Publisher: Bloomington, Ind. University Linguistics Club

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract


Book
The myth of semantic presupposition.
Authors: ---
Year: 1976 Publisher: Bloomington Indiana University. Linguistics club

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

Keywords


Book
Papers in nonphonology
Authors: --- ---
Year: 1976 Publisher: Columbus Ohio State University

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

Keywords


Book
Papers in nonphonology
Authors: --- --- ---
Year: 1976 Publisher: Columbus (Ohio): Ohio State University. Department of linguistics,

Loading...
Export citation

Choose an application

Bookmark

Abstract

Keywords

Listing 1 - 10 of 10
Sort by