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Theoretical papers link the liquidity premium to the optimal trading decisions of investors facing transaction costs. In particular, investors' holding periods determine how transaction costs are amortized and priced in asset returns. Using a unique data set containing two million trades, this paper investigates the relationship between holding periods and transaction costs for 66,000 households from a large discount brokerage. The author finds that transaction costs are an important determinant of investors' holding periods, after controlling for household and stock characteristics. The relationship between holding periods and transaction costs is stronger among more sophisticated investors. Households with longer holding periods earn significantly higher returns after amortized transaction costs, and households that have holding periods that are positively related to transaction costs earn both higher gross and net returns. The author shows that there is correlation in the demand for liquid assets across households and, consistent with the notion of flight to liquidity, this demand increases during times of low market liquidity. Households with higher incomes and with higher wealth invested in the stock market supply liquidity when market liquidity is low.

Brokerage --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Equity markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Holding --- Illiquid securities --- Individual investor --- Individual Investors --- International Bank --- Investment Decisions --- Liquid assets --- Liquidity --- Liquidity premium --- Liquidity risk --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market liquidity --- Markets and Market Access --- Mutual Funds --- Private Sector Development --- Return --- Returns --- Stock market --- Stocks --- Trading --- Transaction --- Transaction Costs

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Although financial theory suggests a positive relationship between default risk and equity returns, recent empirical papers find anomalously low returns for stocks with high probabilities of default. The authors show that returns to distressed stocks previously documented are really an amalgamation of anomalies associated with three stock characteristics - leverage, volatility and profitability. In this paper they use a market based measure - corporate credit spreads - to proxy for default risk. Unlike previously used measures that proxy for a firm's real-world probability of default, credit spreads proxy for a risk-adjusted (or a risk-neutral) probability of default and thereby explicitly account for the systematic component of distress risk. The authors show that credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures, such as, bond ratings, accounting variables and structural model parameters. They do not find default risk to be significantly priced in the cross-section of equity returns. There is also no evidence of firms with high default risk delivering anomalously low returns.

Accounting --- Bankruptcy --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Bond ratings --- Bond Spread --- Capital Asset Pricing --- Corporate Bond --- Corporate bonds --- Corporate defaults --- Credit rating --- Credit risk --- Credit spread --- Credit spreads --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Default Risk --- Deposit Insurance --- Economic Theory & Research --- Equity returns --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Fixed Income --- Human capital --- International Bank --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Mutual Funds --- Probability of default --- Stocks

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This paper examines time-series and cross-country variations in default risk co-dependence in the global banking system. The authors construct a default risk measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton contingent claim model, and examine the evolution of the correlation structure of default risk for more than 1,800 banks in more than 60 countries. They find that there has been a significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the three-year period leading to the financial crisis. They also find that countries that are more integrated, and that have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision, have higher co-dependence in their banking sector. The results support an increase in scope for intra-national supervisory co-operation, as well as capital charges for "too-connected-to-fail" institutions that can impose significant externalities.

Access to Finance --- Banking crises --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Debt Markets --- Default risk --- Distance-to-default --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Private Sector Development --- Systemic risk --- Too big to fail

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This paper examines time-series and cross-country variations in default risk co-dependence in the global banking system. The authors construct a default risk measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton contingent claim model, and examine the evolution of the correlation structure of default risk for more than 1,800 banks in more than 60 countries. They find that there has been a significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the three-year period leading to the financial crisis. They also find that countries that are more integrated, and that have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision, have higher co-dependence in their banking sector. The results support an increase in scope for intra-national supervisory co-operation, as well as capital charges for "too-connected-to-fail" institutions that can impose significant externalities.

Access to Finance --- Banking crises --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Debt Markets --- Default risk --- Distance-to-default --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Private Sector Development --- Systemic risk --- Too big to fail

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Did the U.S. government's intervention in the Chrysler reorganization overturn bankruptcy law? Critics argue that the government-sponsored reorganization impermissibly elevated claims of the auto union over those of Chrysler's other creditors. If the critics are correct, businesses might suffer an increase in their cost of debt because creditors will perceive a new risk, that organized labor might leap-frog them in bankruptcy. This paper examines the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. The authors find no evidence of a negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by bondholders of unionized firms. They thus reject the notion that investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities. To the contrary, bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to the Chrysler bailout. This evidence suggests that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind unionized firms. The results are consistent with the notion that too-big-to-fail government policies generate moral hazard in the credit markets.

Access to Finance --- Bankruptcies --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Bankruptcy laws --- Cost of debt --- Creditor --- Creditor claims --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Insurance --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial markets --- Government interventions --- Private Sector Development --- Reorganizations --- Risk Factors