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Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics, helped create the theory of markets with asymmetric information and was one of the founders of modern development economics. He played a leading role in an intellectual revolution that changed the characterization of a market economy. In the new paradigm, the price system only imperfectly solves the information problem of scarcity because of the many other information problems that arise in the economy: the selection over hidden characteristics, the provision of incentives for hidden behaviors and for innovation, and the coordination of choices over institutions.
Adverse Selection --- Debt Markets --- Development Economics --- Economic Theory --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Efficient Outcomes --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Imperfect Information --- Incentive Problems --- Innovation --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Economy --- Markets and Market Access --- Perfect Information --- Social Protections and Labor
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Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics, helped create the theory of markets with asymmetric information and was one of the founders of modern development economics. He played a leading role in an intellectual revolution that changed the characterization of a market economy. In the new paradigm, the price system only imperfectly solves the information problem of scarcity because of the many other information problems that arise in the economy: the selection over hidden characteristics, the provision of incentives for hidden behaviors and for innovation, and the coordination of choices over institutions.
Adverse Selection --- Debt Markets --- Development Economics --- Economic Theory --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Efficient Outcomes --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Imperfect Information --- Incentive Problems --- Innovation --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Economy --- Markets and Market Access --- Perfect Information --- Social Protections and Labor
Choose an application
Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants.
Accounting --- Adverse Selection --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Contract Law --- Contracts --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Effects --- Efficiency --- Equity --- Family Labor --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Incentive Problems --- Incentives --- Information --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Labor Allocation --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monitoring --- Moral Hazard --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Policies --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Production --- Productivity --- Property Rights --- Real Estate Development --- Risk --- Social Protections and Labor --- Supply --- Theory --- Urban Development --- Urban Housing
Choose an application
Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants.
Accounting --- Adverse Selection --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Contract Law --- Contracts --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Effects --- Efficiency --- Equity --- Family Labor --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Incentive Problems --- Incentives --- Information --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Labor Allocation --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monitoring --- Moral Hazard --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Policies --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Production --- Productivity --- Property Rights --- Real Estate Development --- Risk --- Social Protections and Labor --- Supply --- Theory --- Urban Development --- Urban Housing
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