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The Internet has radically transformed the way we live our lives. The net changes in consumer surplus and economic activity, however, are difficult to measure because some online activities, such as obtaining news, are new ways of doing old activities while new activities, like social media, have an opportunity cost in terms of activities crowded out. This paper uses data from the American Time Use Survey from 2003 – 2011 to estimate the crowdout effects of leisure time spent online. That data show that time spent online and the share of the population engaged in online activities has been increasing steadily. I find that, on the margin, each minute of online leisure time is correlated with 0.29 fewer minutes on all other types of leisure, with about half of that coming from time spent watching TV and video, 0.05 minutes from (offline) socializing, 0.04 minutes from relaxing and thinking, and the balance from time spent at parties, attending cultural events, and listening to the radio. Each minute of online leisure is also correlated with 0.27 fewer minutes working, 0.12 fewer minutes sleeping, 0.10 fewer minutes in travel time, 0.07 fewer minutes in household activities, and 0.06 fewer minutes in educational activities.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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Zonder onderwerpscode: wereldeconomie, ontwikkelingsproblematiek

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June 1999 - Empirical analysis of telecommunications reforms in 30 African and Latin American countries yields results largely consistent with conventional wisdom. Competition seems to be the most successful change agent, so granting even temporary monopolies may delay the arrival of better services to consumers. Reformers are correct to emphasize that regulatory reform accompany privatization, as privatization without regulation reform may be costly to consumers. Wallsten explores the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984 through 1997. Competition is associated with tangible benefits in terms of mainline penetration, number of pay phones, connection capacity, and reduced prices. Fixed-effects regressions reveal that competition-measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent telecommunications provider-is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines, pay phones, and connection capacity, and with decreases in the price of local calls. Privatizing an incumbent is negatively correlated with mainline penetration and connection capacity. Privatization combined with regulation by an independent regulator, however, is positively correlated with connection capacity and substantially mitigates privatization's negative correlation with mainline penetration. Reformers are right to emphasize a combination of privatization, competition, and regulation. But researchers must explore the permutations of regulation: What type of regulation do countries adopt (price caps versus cost-of-service, for example)? How does the regulatory agency work? What is its annual budget? How many employees does it have? Where do the regulators come from? What sort of training and experience do they have? What enforcement powers does the regulatory agency have? In addition, researchers must deal with endogeneity of privatization, competition, and regulation to deal with issues of causality. This paper-a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group-is part of a larger research effort to analyze the role of competition in telecommunications with special emphasis on Africa. The author may be contacted at wallsten@stanford.edu.

Banks and Banking Reform --- Business --- Business Services --- Data --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Education --- Emerging Markets --- ICT Policy and Strategies --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Infrastructure Regulation --- Institutions --- Knowledge Economy --- Knowledge for Development --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Performance --- Price --- Prices --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Regulation --- Reliability --- Results --- Social Protections and Labor --- Technology --- Telecom --- Telecommunication --- Telecommunication Reforms --- Telecommunications --- Telephone --- Telephone Connections --- Telephone Service --- Telephones --- User --- Users

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Until recently, utility services (telecommunications, power, water, and gas) throughout the world were provided by large, usually state-owned, monopolies. However, encouraged by technological change, regulatory innovation, and pressure from international organizations, many developing countries are privatizing state-owned companies and introducing competition. Some observers worry that even if reforms improve efficiency, they might compromise an important public policy goal-ensuring "universal access" for low-income and rural households. Clarke and Wallsten review the motivation for universal service, methods used to try to achieve it under monopoly service provision, how reforms might affect these approaches, and the theoretical and empirical evidence of the impact of reform on these consumers. Next, using household data from around the world, they investigate empirically the historical performance of public monopolies in meeting universal service obligations and the impact of reform. The results show the massive failure of state monopolies to provide service to poor and rural households everywhere except Eastern Europe. Moreover, while the data are limited, the evidence suggests that reforms have not harmed poor and rural consumers, and in many cases have improved their access to utility services. Nevertheless, because competition undermines traditional methods of funding universal service objectives (cross-subsidies), the authors also review mechanisms that could finance these objectives without compromising the benefits of reforms. This paper-a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group-is a background paper for the Policy Research Report on The Regulation of Infrastructure. The authors may be contacted at gclarke@worldbank.org or swallsten@worldbank.org.

Banks and Banking Reform --- Benefits --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Competition --- Competition Policy --- Consumers --- Costs --- Development --- Development Strategies --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Externalities --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Goods --- Housing and Human Habitats --- Income --- Income Levels --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monopolies --- Monopoly --- Poverty Reduction --- Prices --- Private Sector Development --- Profits --- Public Sector Economics and Finance --- Public Sector Management and Reform --- Rural Development --- Rural Poverty Reduction --- Subsidies --- Telecommunications --- Theory --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Trends --- Utility --- Water Supply and Sanitation