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"This program evaluation estimates the effects on standardized test scores of graduating from the Fe y Alegria private school system in Venezuela. The authors find an Average Treatment Effect on the order of 0.1 standard deviations (approximately 16 percent of the average score), using a control group of public school students. These effects are significantly larger for households at the bottom of the distribution, and smaller for those at the top. The authors posit that the better performance of the Fe y Alegria system stems from their labor contract flexibility and decentralized administrative structure. "--World Bank web site.
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"This program evaluation estimates the effects on standardized test scores of graduating from the Fe y Alegria private school system in Venezuela. The authors find an Average Treatment Effect on the order of 0.1 standard deviations (approximately 16 percent of the average score), using a control group of public school students. These effects are significantly larger for households at the bottom of the distribution, and smaller for those at the top. The authors posit that the better performance of the Fe y Alegria system stems from their labor contract flexibility and decentralized administrative structure. "--World Bank web site.
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In 2004, the Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.5 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the loss aggregate TFP from the misallocation of workers across jobs was substantial, on the order of 3 percent of GDP.
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Bogotá intensified state presence to make high-crime streets safer. We show that spillovers outweighed direct effects on security. We randomly assigned 1,919 "hot spot" streets to eight months of doubled policing, increased municipal services, both, or neither. Spillovers in dense networks cause "fuzzy clustering," and we show valid hypothesis testing requires randomization inference. State presence improved security on hot spots. But data from all streets suggest that intensive policing pushed property crime around the corner, with ambiguous impacts on violent crime. Municipal services had positive but imprecise spillovers. These results contrast with prior studies concluding policing has positive spillovers.
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In 2004, the Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of several million voters whom had attempted to remove him from office throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chavez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chavez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.5 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the loss aggregate TFP from the misallocation of workers across jobs was substantial, on the order of 3 percent of GDP.
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Cities target police patrols and public services to control crime. What are the direct and spillover effects of such targeted state services? In 2016 the city of Bogotá, Colombia, experimented on an unprecedented scale. They randomly assigned 1,919 streets to either 8 months of doubled police patrols, greater municipal services, both, or neither. We study how crime responds to intensifying normal state presence in moderate- to high-crime streets, and what this implies about criminal behavior. Scale also brings challenges. Spatial spillovers in dense networks introduce bias and complicate variance estimation through "fuzzy clustering." But a design-based approach and randomization inference produce valid hypothesis tests in such settings. We find that increasing state presence has modest direct impacts, even when focusing on the highest-crime "hot spots." More intense state presence deters more crime. But in most cases, however, crime appears to displace to neighboring streets. Property crimes seem most easily displaced, while violent crimes may not be. One interpretation is that crimes with a more sustained motive are more likely to displace than crimes of passion, which state presence may more permanently deter.
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, Venezuela had one of the poorest economies in Latin America, but by 1970 it had become the richest country in the region and one of the twenty richest countries in the world, ahead of countries such as Greece, Israel, and Spain. Between 1978 and 2001, however, Venezuela’s economy went sharply in reverse, with non-oil GDP declining by almost 19 percent and oil GDP by an astonishing 65 percent. What accounts for this drastic turnabout? The editors of Venezuela Before Chávez, who each played a policymaking role in the country’s economy during the past two decades, have brought together a group of economists and political scientists to examine systematically the impact of a wide range of factors affecting the economy’s collapse, from the cost of labor regulation and the development of financial markets to the weakening of democratic governance and the politics of decisions about industrial policy. Aside from the editors, the contributors are Omar Bello, Adriana Bermúdez, Matías Braun, Javier Corrales, Jonathan Di John, Rafael Di Tella, Javier Donna, Samuel Freije, Dan Levy, Robert MacCulloch, Osmel Manzano, Francisco Monaldi, María Antonia Moreno, Daniel Ortega, Michael Penfold, José Pineda, Lant Pritchett, Cameron A. Shelton, and Dean Yang.
Financial crises --- Crashes, Financial --- Crises, Financial --- Financial crashes --- Financial panics --- Panics (Finance) --- Stock exchange crashes --- Stock market panics --- Crises --- Venezuela --- Venesuėla --- Republic of Venezuela --- República de Venezuela --- Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela --- República Bolivariana de Venezuela --- Gobierno Bolivariano --- Estados Unidos de Venezuela --- Венесуэла --- Баліварыянская Рэспубліка Венесуэла --- Balivaryi︠a︡nskai︠a︡ Rėspublika Venesuėla --- Венецуела --- Venet︠s︡uela --- Боливарска република Венецуела --- Bolivarska republika Venet︠s︡uela --- Βενεζουέλα --- Venezouela --- Μπολιβαριανή Δημοκρατία της Βενεζουέλας --- Bolivarianē Dēmokratia tēs Venezouelas --- 베네수엘라 --- Penesuella --- 베네수엘라 볼리바르 공화국 --- Penesuella Bollibarŭ Konghwaguk --- Венесуэл --- Venesuėl --- Bu̇gd Naĭramdakh Bolivaryn Venesuėl Uls --- ベネズエラ --- Benezuera --- ベネズエラ・ボリバル共和国 --- Benezuera Boribaru Kyōwakoku --- Боливарианская Республика Венесуэла --- Bolivarianskai︠a︡ Respublika Venesuėla --- Venecuela --- Bolivarska Republika Venecuela --- Venezuelan bolivariaaninen tasavalta --- Bolivarianska republiken Venezuela --- Bolivarcı Venezuela Cumhuriyeti --- Wenesuela --- Wenesuela Boliwar Respublikasy --- Венесуела --- Боліварианська Республіка Венесуела --- Bolivaryansʹka Respublika Venesuela --- 委內瑞拉 --- Weineiruila --- 委內瑞拉玻利瓦爾共和國 --- Weineiruila Boliwa'er Gongheguo --- Economic policy. --- Economic conditions --- E-books --- Financial crises. --- Venezuela.
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