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This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.

Information retrieval. --- Information organization. --- Computer science. --- Computer Communication Networks. --- Computer software. --- Information storage and retrieval systems. --- e-Commerce/e-business. --- Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity. --- Mathematics of Computing. --- Engineering & Applied Sciences --- Computer Science --- Automatic data storage --- Automatic information retrieval --- Automation in documentation --- Computer-based information systems --- Data processing systems --- Data storage and retrieval systems --- Discovery systems, Information --- Information discovery systems --- Information processing systems --- Information retrieval systems --- Machine data storage and retrieval --- Mechanized information storage and retrieval systems --- Software, Computer --- Informatics --- Information storage and retrieval --- Organization of information --- Data retrieval --- Data storage --- Discovery, Information --- Information discovery --- Retrieval of information --- Computer communication systems. --- Algorithms. --- Computer science --- Information storage and retrieval. --- E-commerce. --- Computer Science. --- Information Storage and Retrieval. --- Mathematics. --- Internet --- Information storage and retrieva. --- Science --- Computer systems --- Electronic information resources --- Data libraries --- Digital libraries --- Information organization --- Information retrieval --- Computer science—Mathematics. --- Algorism --- Algebra --- Arithmetic --- Communication systems, Computer --- Computer communication systems --- Data networks, Computer --- ECNs (Electronic communication networks) --- Electronic communication networks --- Networks, Computer --- Teleprocessing networks --- Data transmission systems --- Digital communications --- Electronic systems --- Information networks --- Telecommunication --- Cyberinfrastructure --- Electronic data processing --- Network computers --- Cybercommerce --- E-business --- E-commerce --- E-tailing --- eBusiness --- eCommerce --- Electronic business --- Internet commerce --- Internet retailing --- Online commerce --- Web retailing --- Commerce --- Information superhighway --- Foundations --- Distributed processing

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Written by more than fifty top researchers from economics, OR, and algorithm design, this text comprehensively covers a major inter-disciplinary field and its important applications from the basics to state of the art. Key chapters discuss efficiency, fairness and incentives, and market design and its relation to social choice theory.

Economics --- Commerce --- Operations research. --- Matching theory. --- Algorithms --- Mathematical models. --- Design. --- Algorism --- Algebra --- Arithmetic --- Combinatorial analysis --- Marriage theorem --- Operational analysis --- Operational research --- Industrial engineering --- Management science --- Research --- System theory --- Economics, Mathematical --- Foundations --- Operations research --- Matching theory

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We study a model of social learning and communication using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sender and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an action whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown state of the world. The sender has access to a collection of n samples correlated with the state of the world, which we think of as specific anecdotes or pieces of evidence, and can send exactly one of these samples to the receiver in order to influence her choice of action. Importantly, the sender's personal preferences may differ from the receiver's, which affects the seller's strategic choice of which anecdote to send. We show that if the sender's communication scheme is observable to the receiver (that is, the choice of which anecdote to send given the set they receive), then they will choose an unbiased and maximally informative communication scheme, no matter the difference in preferences. Without observability, however, even a small difference in preferences can lead to a significant bias in the choice of anecdote, which the receiver must then account for. This can significantly reduce the informativeness of the signal, leading to substantial utility loss for both sides. One implication is informational homophily: a receiver can rationally prefer to obtain information from a poorly-informed sender with aligned preferences, rather than a knowledgeable expert whose preferences may differ from her own.