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Commercial poker solvers emerged around 2015, these are paid software used by poker players to study the game and improve their strategies and whose purpose is to find the best way to play in certain poker situations. Unfortunately for us, their implementation is a black box. As poker players and computer science students, we asked ourselves two questions. Why did the most popular poker solvers appear during this period? How to implement our own poker solver? We answer these questions in this thesis. We review the scientific literature and find that in 2015 the Heads-Up Limit Texas Hold’em poker variant has been weakly solved for the first time by a computer program called Cepheus. This poker variant contains 1014 decision points and has been a challenge for artificial intelligence for over 10 years. We find that the best poker AIs after this period face the same challenges and use techniques that have commonalities to solve them. We describe the challenges and techniques used to create a poker solver. The most common challenges are related to the size of a poker game, the computing power and memory required to solve and store a strategy for a game of this magnitude. We implement a poker solver capable of solving abstractions of different poker variants on a home computer using techniques such as Couterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and game abstractions. We also create tools to read and study the strategies calculated by our solver. At the end of this thesis, we show that our results are consistent with the results obtained by commercial poker solvers and we discuss ways to improve our implementation and to solve poker situations in games as big as No Limit Texas Hold’em.
poker --- solver --- counterfactual regret minimization --- cfr --- Nash equilibrium --- imperfect information games --- games theory --- Ingénierie, informatique & technologie > Sciences informatiques
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Significant income gains from migrating from poorer to richer countries have motivated unilateral (source-country) policies facilitating labor emigration. However, their effectiveness is unknown. The authors conducted a large-scale randomized experiment in the Philippines testing the impact of unilaterally facilitating international labor migration. The most intensive treatment doubled the rate of job offers but had no identifiable effect on international labor migration. Even the highest overseas job-search rate that was induced (22 percent) falls far short of the share initially expressing interest in migrating (34 percent). The paper concludes that unilateral migration facilitation will at most induce a trickle, not a flood, of additional emigration.
Access to Finance --- Barriers to Migration --- Field Experiment --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Imperfect Information --- International Migration --- Job-Matching --- Labor Markets --- Labor Policies --- Passport Costs --- Population Policies --- Private Sector Development --- Unilateral Migration Policy --- Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement
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Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics, helped create the theory of markets with asymmetric information and was one of the founders of modern development economics. He played a leading role in an intellectual revolution that changed the characterization of a market economy. In the new paradigm, the price system only imperfectly solves the information problem of scarcity because of the many other information problems that arise in the economy: the selection over hidden characteristics, the provision of incentives for hidden behaviors and for innovation, and the coordination of choices over institutions.
Adverse Selection --- Debt Markets --- Development Economics --- Economic Theory --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Efficient Outcomes --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Imperfect Information --- Incentive Problems --- Innovation --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Economy --- Markets and Market Access --- Perfect Information --- Social Protections and Labor
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Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics, helped create the theory of markets with asymmetric information and was one of the founders of modern development economics. He played a leading role in an intellectual revolution that changed the characterization of a market economy. In the new paradigm, the price system only imperfectly solves the information problem of scarcity because of the many other information problems that arise in the economy: the selection over hidden characteristics, the provision of incentives for hidden behaviors and for innovation, and the coordination of choices over institutions.
Adverse Selection --- Debt Markets --- Development Economics --- Economic Theory --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Efficient Outcomes --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Imperfect Information --- Incentive Problems --- Innovation --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Economy --- Markets and Market Access --- Perfect Information --- Social Protections and Labor
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This book contributes to the literature on conflict and terrorism through a selection of articles that deal with theoretical, methodological and empirical issues related to the topic. The papers study important problems, are original in their approach and innovative in the techniques used. This will be useful for researchers in the fields of game theory, economics and political sciences.
European Union (EU), spatial autoregression and connectivity --- alliance --- strategic free riding --- Nash equilibrium --- terror cycles --- terror paths --- counterterror policy --- conflict dynamics --- asymmetric conflict --- continuous game --- national security --- Blotto game --- imperfect information --- machine learning --- terrorism --- game theory --- hybrid threats --- state competition --- prospect theory --- grand strategy --- retaliation --- counterterror --- coalition --- backlash --- conflict --- contests --- momentum --- n/a
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This book contributes to the literature on conflict and terrorism through a selection of articles that deal with theoretical, methodological and empirical issues related to the topic. The papers study important problems, are original in their approach and innovative in the techniques used. This will be useful for researchers in the fields of game theory, economics and political sciences.
Economic history --- European Union (EU), spatial autoregression and connectivity --- alliance --- strategic free riding --- Nash equilibrium --- terror cycles --- terror paths --- counterterror policy --- conflict dynamics --- asymmetric conflict --- continuous game --- national security --- Blotto game --- imperfect information --- machine learning --- terrorism --- game theory --- hybrid threats --- state competition --- prospect theory --- grand strategy --- retaliation --- counterterror --- coalition --- backlash --- conflict --- contests --- momentum
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