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Three main features characterize the international financial integration of China and India. First, while only having a small global share of privately-held external assets and liabilities (with the exception of China's foreign direct investment liabilities), these countries are large holders of official reserves. Second, their international balance sheets are highly asymmetric: both are "short equity, long debt." Third, China and India have improved their net external positions over the past decade although, based on their income level, neoclassical models would predict them to be net borrowers. Domestic financial developments and policies seem essential in understanding these patterns of integration. These include financial liberalization and exchange rate policies, domestic financial sector policies, and the impact of financial reform on savings and investment rates. Changes in these factors will affect the international financial integration of China and India (through shifts in capital flows and asset and liability holdings) and, consequently, the international financial system.
Balance Sheets --- Bank Policy --- Borrowers --- Capital Flows --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Equity --- Exchange --- Exchange Rate --- External Assets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Developments --- Financial Liberalization --- Financial Literacy --- Holdings --- Income Level --- International Financial Integration --- International Financial System --- Investment --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Investment Rates --- Liabilities --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Private Sector Development --- Reserves --- Share
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Three main features characterize the international financial integration of China and India. First, while only having a small global share of privately-held external assets and liabilities (with the exception of China's foreign direct investment liabilities), these countries are large holders of official reserves. Second, their international balance sheets are highly asymmetric: both are "short equity, long debt." Third, China and India have improved their net external positions over the past decade although, based on their income level, neoclassical models would predict them to be net borrowers. Domestic financial developments and policies seem essential in understanding these patterns of integration. These include financial liberalization and exchange rate policies, domestic financial sector policies, and the impact of financial reform on savings and investment rates. Changes in these factors will affect the international financial integration of China and India (through shifts in capital flows and asset and liability holdings) and, consequently, the international financial system.
Balance Sheets --- Bank Policy --- Borrowers --- Capital Flows --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Equity --- Exchange --- Exchange Rate --- External Assets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Developments --- Financial Liberalization --- Financial Literacy --- Holdings --- Income Level --- International Financial Integration --- International Financial System --- Investment --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Investment Rates --- Liabilities --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Private Sector Development --- Reserves --- Share
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June 2000 - Collective action clauses raise borrowing costs for low-rated borrowers and lower them for high-rated borrowers. This result holds for all developing country bonds and also for the subset of sovereign bond issuers. It is easy to say that the International Monetary Fund should not resort to financial rescue for countries in crisis; this is hard to do when there is no alternative. That is where collective action clauses come inches Collective action clauses are designed to facilitate debt restructuring by the principals - borrowers and lenders - with minimal intervention by international financial institutions. Despite much discussion of this option, there has been little action. Issuers of bonds fear that collective action clauses would raise borrowing costs. Eichengreen and Mody update earlier findings about the impact of collective action clauses on borrowing costs. It has been argued that only in the past year or so have investors focused on the presence of these provisions and that, given the international financial institutions' newfound resolve to bail in investors, they now regard these clauses with trepidation. Extending their data to 1999, Eichengreen and Mody find no evidence of such changes but rather the same pattern as before: Collective action clauses raise the costs of borrowing for low-rated issuers but reduce them for issuers with good credit ratings. Their results hold both for the full set of bonds and for bonds issued only by sovereigns. They argue that these results should reassure those who regard collective action clauses as an important element in the campaign to strengthen international financial architecture. This paper - a product of the Development Prospects Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze international capital flows. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Pricing of Bonds and Bank Loans in the Market for Developing Country Debt. The authors may be contacted at eichengr@econ.berkeley.edu or amody@worldbank.org.
Borrowers --- Borrowing Costs --- Collective Action --- Collective Action Clauses --- Credit Ratings --- Crisis Country --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Debt Restructuring --- Emerging Markets --- Equity --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Markets --- Financial Support --- Foreign Investors --- Holding --- International Financial Institutions --- International Financial System --- Investors --- Lenders --- Lending --- Moral Hazard --- Private Sector Development
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June 2000 - What explains the spread of both democracy and financial openness at this time in history, given the constraining impact of financial market integration on national policy autonomy? International policy coordination is part of the answer, but not all. Also important is the presence of cost-effective redistributive schemes that provide insurance against the risk of financial instability. The debate about the relationship between democratic forms of government and the free movement of capital across borders dates to the 18th century. It has regained prominence as capital on a massive scale has become increasingly mobile and as free economies experience continuous pressure from rapidly changing technology, market integration, changing consumer preferences, and intensified competition. These changes imply greater uncertainty about citizens' future income positions, which could prompt them to seek insurance through the marketplace or through constitutionally arranged income redistribution. As more countries move toward democracy, the availability of such insurance mechanisms to citizens is key if political pressure for capital controls is to be averted and if public support for an open, liberal international financial order is to be maintained. Dailami briefly reviews how today's international financial system evolved from one of mostly closed capital accounts immediately after World War II to today's enormous, largely free-flowing market. Drawing on insights from the literature on public choice and constitutional political economy, Dailami develops an analytical framework for a welfare cost-benefit analysis of financial openness to international capital flows. The main welfare benefits of financial openness derive from greater economic efficiency and increased opportunities for risk diversification. The welfare costs relate to the cost of insurance used as a mechanism for coping with the risks of financial volatility. These insurance costs are the economic losses associated with redistribution, including moral hazard, rent-seeking, and rent-avoidance. A cross-sectional analysis of a large sample of developed and developing countries shows the positive correlation between democracy (as defined by political and civil liberty) and financial openness. More rigorous econometric investigation using logit analysis and controlling for level of income also shows that redistributive social policies are key in determining the likelihood that countries can successfully combine an openness to international capital mobility with democratic forms of government. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute- is part of a broader research effort on The Quality of Growth. The author may be contacted at mdailami@worldbank.org.
Banks and Banking Reform --- Bonds --- Capital Flows --- Capital Movements --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Developing Countries --- Economic Efficiency --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Openness --- Free Capital --- Future --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Government Policies --- Information Technologies --- Insurance --- International Capital --- International Capital Mobility --- International Financial Markets --- International Financial System --- International Lending --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomic Management --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market --- Market Integration --- Moral Hazard --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Social Protections and Labor
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November 1999 - Three approaches to regulatory frameworks for financial systems - and a scenario for development of the world financial system that assumes a market solution. In developing the architecture for a financial system, the challenge is to combine deregulation and safety nets against systemic failure with effective prudential regulation and oversight. Klein analyzes three approaches to choosing an adequate regulatory framework for a financial system; Those most worried about panic and herd behavior tend to favor relatively extensive controls on financial institutions' activities, including controls on interest rates and on the volume and direction of lending; Those most concerned about moral hazard advocate abolishing controls and safety nets, seeing the solution in stronger market discipline and reduced powers and discretion for regulators; Mainstream opinion advocates a mix of measures, to both strengthen market discipline and improve regulatory oversight. The approach a country opts for depends on (1) which monetary and exchange rate regime it chooses, (2) whether it is more concerned about moral hazard or about panic and herd behavior, and (3) how the politics of reform shape its solutions. Klein suggests a scenario for development of the global financial system over the next two or three decades that assumes that the final outcome will resemble the market solution - not because that is the optimal policy choice but because of how political weaknesses will interact with advances in settlement technology. In Klein's scenario, the world moves toward a monetary system in which fixed exchange rate systems or de facto currency competition limit the power of central banks. This limits options for discretionary and open-ended liquidity support to help deal with systemic financial crises. The costs of inflexible exchange rates are moderated by new types of wage contracts, using units of account that are correlated with the shocks a particular industry or kind of contract faces - thus maintaining the positive aspects of monetary systems with flexible nominal exchange rates. Mistrust in monetary authorities and the emergence of private settlement systems lead to a return of asset-backed money as the means of payment. The disciplines on financial systems come to resemble somewhat those of historical free banking systems, with financial institutions requiring high levels of equity and payments systems protected only by limited, fully funded safety nets. This paper - a product of Private Participation in Infrastructure, Private Sector Development Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to understand regulatory issues. The author may be contacted at michael.u.klein@si.shell.com.
Banks and Banking Reform --- Central Banks --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange --- Exchange Rate --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Institutions --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Systems --- Fixed Exchange Rate --- Future --- Interest --- Interest Rates --- International Financial System --- Lending --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market --- Market Discipline --- Moral Hazard --- Private Sector Development --- Prudential Regulation --- Regulatory Framework --- Regulatory Oversight --- Safety Nets --- Settlement
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