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C-17 (Jet transport) --- United States. --- Procurement.

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As weapon-system production comes to an end, the question of whether, and what, tooling to store rather than dispose of arises. This report addresses the specific case of weapon system-specific production-only tooling for the C-17 cargo aircraft. Specifically, these are the tools that are not needed simply to keep the aircraft in good repair and that cannot be repurposed for other weapon systems. Storage is not free, so disposal of this tooling can be less costly than saving it. But such tooling might become necessary for a production restart or production of a variant, and making all-new tools can be expensive. Other things being equal, the higher the perceived probability of production restart, the greater the desirability of retaining production-only tooling. However, some tools cost more to store than they are worth. While the authors do not weigh in on the actual probability of a C-17 restart, they show which production-only tools should be retained and which should not given a perceived restart probability. They further note that time in storage is also a factor: If tools' values decline while in storage, tooling retention is less desirable.

C-17 (Jet transport) --- Machine-tools --- Design and construction. --- Costs.

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In 1995, RAND was asked to support a study, called the C-17 Tactical Utility Analysis (TUA), to examine possible roles for the C-17 as an in-theater airlifter. The study, conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD[PA & E]), with the support of the Services, found a need for up to a squadron of C 17s operating in-theater during major regional contingencies. The work described in this Documented Briefing used the same assumptions as those in the Tactical Utility Analysis, but a different analytic approach, thereby helping to validate the findings. RAND had two objectives in its support of the TUA: one to estimate the capacity of airfields to support air mobility operations and the other to evaluate possible concepts of operation for in-theater C-17 operations. The first objective is addressed in James P. Stucker, Ruth T. Berg, et al., Understanding Airfield Capacity for Airlift Operations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-700-AF/OSD (forthcoming). This Documented Briefing addresses the second objective. The authors conclude that there is a robust role for about one squadron of 12 C-17s in-theater during major regional contingencies. However, this number holds only if the assumption is made that the aircraft must be assigned to the theater for the entire duration of the contingency. Even greater benefit may be obtained by deploying more C-17s for in-theater operations during some parts of the contingency and fewer at other times.

Airlift, Military --- C-17 (Jet transport) --- Deployment (Strategy) --- United States. --- Ground support.

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C-17 (Jet transport) --- Airlift, Military --- United States. --- Procurement. --- United States --- Armed Forces --- Weapons systems --- Cost control.

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Aircraft operations on soft fields are limited due to field rutting. Each subsequent aircraft pass, defined as one takeoff and one landing, increases field rutting until the field reaches a point where further aircraft operations are no longer permissible. The ability of aircraft to operate on soft fields is often expressed as a function of aircraft landing weight and the California Bearing Ratio (CBR) of the field, which measures the ability the soil to resist compressive loads. Because soft fields can support only a limited number of takeoffs and landings, it is important to understand how to maximize the cargo throughput at these soft fields. This document shows that there exists an optimum landing weight that allows for maximum cargo delivery. This optimum landing weight is found to be constant and independent of field CBR. One of the three objectives of this study was to inform important analytic tradeoffs. Understanding the ability of aircraft to operate from soft fields is one of these important trade-offs. This document details the mathematical calculations used to determine the optimum landing weight that allows for maximum cargo delivery.

Airlift, Military --- C-17 (Jet transport) --- Air bases, American --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Military Administration --- Planning --- American air bases --- Globemaster III (Jet transport) --- Air transport, Military --- Military airlift --- Jet planes, Military --- Jet transports --- McDonnell Douglas aircraft --- Aeronautics, Military --- Transportation, Military --- Air bases, American.