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Presidents --- Comparative government --- Economic policy --- Présidents --- Institutions politiques comparées --- Politique économique --- #SBIB:014.AANKOOP --- #SBIB:324H40 --- #SBIB:35H435 --- Economic nationalism --- Economic planning --- National planning --- State planning --- Economics --- Planning --- National security --- Social policy --- Comparative political systems --- Comparative politics --- Government, Comparative --- Political systems, Comparative --- Political science --- Presidency --- Heads of state --- Executive power --- Politieke structuren: algemeen --- Beleidssectoren: economisch en werkgelegenheidsbeleid --- Comparative government. --- Economic policy. --- Presidents. --- Geografie --- Sociale geografie --- Politieke Geografie. --- Présidents --- Institutions politiques comparées --- Politique économique

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Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.

Political parties --- #SBIB:324H43 --- #SBIB:328H31 --- Politieke structuren: politieke partijen --- Instellingen en beleid: VSA / USA --- United States. --- U.S. House of Representatives --- House of Representatives (U.S.) --- Palata Predstaviteleĭ Kongressa SShA --- Committees. --- Rules and practice. --- Social Sciences --- Political Science

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The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

Political parties --- United States. --- U.S. House of Representatives --- House of Representatives (U.S.) --- Palata Predstaviteleĭ Kongressa SShA --- Committees. --- Leadership. --- Rules and practice. --- Social Sciences --- Political Science

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