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In Frege's Conception of Logic Patricia A. Blanchette explores the relationship between Gottlob Frege's understanding of conceptual analysis and his understanding of logic. She argues that the fruitfulness of Frege's conception of logic, and the illuminating differences between that conception and those more modern views that have largely supplanted it, are best understood against the backdrop of a clear account of the role of conceptual analysis in logical investigation.The first part of the book locates the role of conceptual analysis in Frege's logicist project. Blanchette argues that despite a number of difficulties, Frege's use of analysis in the service of logicism is a powerful and coherent tool. As a result of coming to grips with his use of that tool, we can see that there is, despite appearances, no conflict between Frege's intention to demonstrate the grounds of ordinary arithmetic and the fact that the numerals of his derived sentences fail to co-refer with ordinary numerals. In the second part of the book, Blanchette explores the resulting conception of logic itself, and some of the straightforward ways in which Frege's conception differs from its now-familiar descendants. In particular, Blanchette argues that consistency, as Frege understands it, differs significantly from the kind of consistency demonstrable via the construction of models. To appreciate this difference is to appreciate the extent to which Frege was right in his debate with Hilbert over consistency- and independence-proofs in geometry. For similar reasons, modern results such as the completeness of formal systems and the categoricity of theories do not have for Frege the same importance they are commonly taken to have by his post-Tarskian descendants. These differences, together with the coherence of Frege's position, provide reason for caution with respect to the appeal to formal systems and their properties in the treatment of fundamental logical properties and relations.
Frege, Gottlob --- Logic. --- Logique --- Frege, Gottlob, --- Logic --- Argumentation --- Deduction (Logic) --- Deductive logic --- Dialectic (Logic) --- Logic, Deductive --- Intellect --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Science --- Reasoning --- Thought and thinking --- Methodology --- Frege, G. --- Fu-lei-ko, --- Frege, Friedrich Gottlob, --- פרגה, גוטלוב, --- Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob, --- Frege, Gottlob, - 1848-1925
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In From Kant to Husserl, Charles Parsons examines a wide range of historical opinion on philosophical questions, from mathematics to phenomenology. Amplifying his early ideas on Kant's philosophy of arithmetic, Parsons uses Kant's lectures on metaphysics to explore how his arithmetical concepts relate to the categories. He then turns to early reactions by two immediate successors of Kant, Johann Schultz and Bernard Bolzano, to shed light on disputed questions regarding interpretation of Kant's philosophy of mathematics. Interested, as well, in what Kant meant by "pure natural science," Parsons considers the relationship between the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. His commentary on Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic departs from mathematics to engage the vexed question of what it tells about the meaning of Kant's transcendental idealism.Proceeding on to phenomenology, Parsons examines Frege's evolving idea of extensions, his attitude toward set theory, and his correspondence, particularly exchanges with Russell and Husserl. An essay on Brentano brings out, in the case of judgment, an alternative to the now standard Fregean view of negation, and, on truth, alternatives to the traditional correspondence view that are still discussed today. Ending with the question of why Husserl did not take the "linguistic turn," a final essay included here marks the only article-length discussion of Husserl Parsons has ever written, despite a long-standing engagement with this philosopher.
Philosophy, German --- Philosophy, Modern. --- Kant, Immanuel, --- Frege, Gottlob, --- Philosophy, Modern --- Modern philosophy --- Kant, Emmanuel --- Kant, Emanuel --- Kant, Emanuele --- Frege, G. --- Fu-lei-ko, --- Frege, Friedrich Gottlob, --- פרגה, גוטלוב, --- Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob, --- Kant, Immanuel --- Kant, I. --- Kānt, ʻAmmānūʼīl, --- Kant, Immanouel, --- Kant, Immanuil, --- Kʻantʻŭ, --- Kant, --- Kant, Emmanuel, --- Ḳanṭ, ʻImanuʼel, --- Kant, E., --- Kant, Emanuel, --- Cantơ, I., --- Kant, Emanuele, --- Kant, Im. --- קאנט --- קאנט, א. --- קאנט, עמנואל --- קאנט, עמנואל, --- קאנט, ע. --- קנט --- קנט, עמנואל --- קנט, עמנואל, --- كانت ، ايمانوئل --- كنت، إمانويل، --- カントイマニユエル, --- Kangde, --- 康德, --- Kanṭ, Īmānwīl, --- كانط، إيمانويل --- Kant, Manuel, --- Kant, Immanuel, - 1724-1804 --- Frege, Gottlob, - 1848-1925
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In From Kant to Husserl, Charles Parsons examines a wide range of historical opinion on philosophical questions, from mathematics to phenomenology. Amplifying his early ideas on Kant's philosophy of arithmetic, Parsons uses Kant's lectures on metaphysics to explore how his arithmetical concepts relate to the categories. He then turns to early reactions by two immediate successors of Kant, Johann Schultz and Bernard Bolzano, to shed light on disputed questions regarding interpretation of Kant's philosophy of mathematics. Interested, as well, in what Kant meant by "pure natural science," Parsons considers the relationship between the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. His commentary on Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic departs from mathematics to engage the vexed question of what it tells about the meaning of Kant's transcendental idealism.Proceeding on to phenomenology, Parsons examines Frege's evolving idea of extensions, his attitude toward set theory, and his correspondence, particularly exchanges with Russell and Husserl. An essay on Brentano brings out, in the case of judgment, an alternative to the now standard Fregean view of negation, and, on truth, alternatives to the traditional correspondence view that are still discussed today. Ending with the question of why Husserl did not take the "linguistic turn," a final essay included here marks the only article-length discussion of Husserl Parsons has ever written, despite a long-standing engagement with this philosopher.
Philosophy, German --- Philosophy, Modern. --- Modern philosophy --- Frege, Gottlob, --- Kant, Immanuel, --- Kant, Immanuel --- Kant, I. --- Kānt, ʻAmmānūʼīl, --- Kant, Immanouel, --- Kant, Immanuil, --- Kʻantʻŭ, --- Kant, --- Kant, Emmanuel, --- Ḳanṭ, ʻImanuʼel, --- Kant, E., --- Kant, Emanuel, --- Cantơ, I., --- Kant, Emanuele, --- Kant, Im. --- קאנט --- קאנט, א. --- קאנט, עמנואל --- קאנט, עמנואל, --- קאנט, ע. --- קנט --- קנט, עמנואל --- קנט, עמנואל, --- كانت ، ايمانوئل --- كنت، إمانويل، --- カントイマニユエル, --- Kangde, --- 康德, --- Kanṭ, Īmānwīl, --- كانط، إيمانويل --- Kant, Manuel, --- Frege, G. --- Fu-lei-ko, --- Frege, Friedrich Gottlob, --- פרגה, גוטלוב, --- Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob,
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In his attempt to give an answer to the question of what constitutes real knowledge, Kant steers a middle course between empiricism and rationalism. True knowledge refers to a given empirical reality, but true knowledge has to be understood as necessary as well, and so consequently, must be a priori. Both demands can only be reconciled if synthetic a priori judgments are possible. To ground this possibility, Kant develops his transcendental logic. In Frege’s program of providing a logicistic basis for true knowledge the same problem is at issue: his logicist solution places the quantifier into the position of the basic element connected to the truth of a proposition. As the basic element of a theory of logic, it refers at the same time to something in reality. Mołczanow argues that Frege’s program fails because it does not pay sufficient attention to Kant’s transcendental logic. Frege interprets synthetic a priori judgments as ultimately analytic, and thus falls back onto a Leibnizian rationalism, thereby ignoring Kant’s middle course. Under the title of the transcendental analytic of quantification Mołczanow discusses Frege’s concept of quantification. For Frege, the proper analysis of number words and the categories of quantity raises problems which can only be solved, according to Mołczanow, with the help of Kant’s transcendental logic. Mołczanow’s book thus deserves its places in the series Critical Studies in German Idealism because it provides a further elaboration of Kant’s transcendental logic by bringing it into conversation with contemporary logic. The result is a new conception of the nature of quantification which speaks to our time.
Logic, Symbolic and mathematical. --- Frege, Gottlob, --- Kant, Immanuel --- Logic, Symbolic and mathematical --- Algebra of logic --- Logic, Universal --- Mathematical logic --- Symbolic and mathematical logic --- Symbolic logic --- Mathematics --- Algebra, Abstract --- Metamathematics --- Set theory --- Syllogism --- Kant, I. --- Kānt, ʻAmmānūʼīl, --- Kant, Immanouel, --- Kant, Immanuil, --- Kʻantʻŭ, --- Kant, --- Kant, Emmanuel, --- Ḳanṭ, ʻImanuʼel, --- Kant, E., --- Kant, Emanuel, --- Cantơ, I., --- Kant, Emanuele, --- Kant, Im. --- קאנט --- קאנט, א. --- קאנט, עמנואל --- קאנט, עמנואל, --- קאנט, ע. --- קנט --- קנט, עמנואל --- קנט, עמנואל, --- كانت ، ايمانوئل --- كنت، إمانويل، --- カントイマニユエル, --- Kangde, --- 康德, --- Kanṭ, Īmānwīl, --- كانط، إيمانويل --- Kant, Manuel, --- Frege, G. --- Fu-lei-ko, --- Frege, Friedrich Gottlob, --- פרגה, גוטלוב, --- Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob, --- Kant, Immanuel, --- Référence (philosophie) --- Calcul des prédicats. --- Quantificateurs (logique mathématique) --- Logique --- Philosophie.
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