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What is the likelihood that the U.S. will experience a devastating catastrophic event over the next few decades -- something that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP and wealth? What does the possibility of such an event imply for the behavior of economic variables such as investment, interest rates, and equity prices? And how much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or likely impact of such an event? We address these questions using a general equilibrium model that describes production, capital accumulation, and household preferences, and includes as an integral part the possible arrival of catastrophic shocks. Calibrating the model to average values of economic and financial variables yields estimates of the implied expected mean arrival rate and impact distribution of catastrophic shocks. We also use the model to calculate the tax on consumption society would accept to reduce the probability or impact of a shock.
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Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete markets model of entrepreneurial finance to demonstrate the important implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. The optimal capital structure is determined by a generalized tradeoff model where leverage via risky non-recourse debt provides significant diversification benefits. More risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but also choose higher leverage, even though leverage makes his equity more risky. Non-diversified entrepreneurs demand both systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium. Cash-out option and external equity further improve diversification and raise the entrepreneur's valuation of the firm. Finally, entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt.
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This paper proposes a simple homogeneous dynamic model of investment and corporate risk management for a financially constrained firm. Following Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), we define a corporation's risk management as the coordination of investment and financing decisions. In our model, corporate risk management involves internal liquidity management, financial hedging, and investment. We determine a firm's optimal cash, investment, asset sales, credit line, external equity finance, and payout policies as functions of the following key parameters: 1) the firm's earnings growth and cash-flow risk; 2) the external cost of financing; 3) the firm's liquidation value; 4) the opportunity cost of holding cash; 5) investment adjustment and asset sales costs; and 6) the return and covariance characteristics of hedging assets the firm can invest in. The optimal cash inventory policy takes the form of a double-barrier policy where i) cash is paid out to shareholders only when the cash-capital ratio hits an endogenous upper barrier, and ii) external funds are raised only when the firm has depleted its cash. In between the two barriers, the firm adjusts its capital expenditures, asset sales, and hedging policies. Several new insights emerge from our analysis. For example, we find an inverse relation between marginal Tobin's q and investment when the firm draws on its credit line. We also find that financially constrained firms may have a lower equity beta in equilibrium because these firms tend to hold higher precautionary cash inventories.
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How likely is a catastrophic event that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP and wealth? How much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe? We answer these questions and provide a framework for policy analysis using a general equilibrium model of production, capital accumulation, and household preferences. Calibrating the model to economic and financial data, we estimate the mean arrival rate of shocks and their size distribution, the tax on consumption society would accept to limit the maximum size of a catastrophic shock, and the cost to insure against its impact.
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This paper proposes a simple homogeneous dynamic model of investment and corporate risk management for a financially constrained firm. Following Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), we define a corporation's risk management as the coordination of investment and financing decisions. In our model, corporate risk management involves internal liquidity management, financial hedging, and investment. We determine a firm's optimal cash, investment, asset sales, credit line, external equity finance, and payout policies as functions of the following key parameters: 1) the firm's earnings growth and cash-flow risk; 2) the external cost of financing; 3) the firm's liquidation value; 4) the opportunity cost of holding cash; 5) investment adjustment and asset sales costs; and 6) the return and covariance characteristics of hedging assets the firm can invest in. The optimal cash inventory policy takes the form of a double-barrier policy where i) cash is paid out to shareholders only when the cash-capital ratio hits an endogenous upper barrier, and ii) external funds are raised only when the firm has depleted its cash. In between the two barriers, the firm adjusts its capital expenditures, asset sales, and hedging policies. Several new insights emerge from our analysis. For example, we find an inverse relation between marginal Tobin's q and investment when the firm draws on its credit line. We also find that financially constrained firms may have a lower equity beta in equilibrium because these firms tend to hold higher precautionary cash inventories.
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Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete markets model of entrepreneurial finance to demonstrate the important implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs' interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. The optimal capital structure is determined by a generalized tradeoff model where leverage via risky non-recourse debt provides significant diversification benefits. More risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but also choose higher leverage, even though leverage makes his equity more risky. Non-diversified entrepreneurs demand both systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium. Cash-out option and external equity further improve diversification and raise the entrepreneur's valuation of the firm. Finally, entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt.
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