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Book
Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,
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Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants.
Accounting --- Adverse Selection --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Contract Law --- Contracts --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Effects --- Efficiency --- Equity --- Family Labor --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Incentive Problems --- Incentives --- Information --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Labor Allocation --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monitoring --- Moral Hazard --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Policies --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Production --- Productivity --- Property Rights --- Real Estate Development --- Risk --- Social Protections and Labor --- Supply --- Theory --- Urban Development --- Urban Housing
Book
Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
In a setting where husbands wield considerable coercive power, forms of marriage should adapt to protect the interests of women and their families. The authors study the pervasive marriage custom of watta satta in rural Pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation. They show that watta satta may be a mechanism to coordinate the actions of two sets of in-laws, each of whom wish to restrain their sons-in-law but who only have the ability to restrain their sons. The authors' empirical results support this view. The likelihood of marital inefficiency, as measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wife's mental health, is significantly lower in watta satta arrangements as compared with conventional marriages, but only after properly accounting for selection.
Anthropology --- Child --- Culture & Development --- Divorce --- Domestic Abuse --- Domestic Violence --- Families --- Family --- Female --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Home --- Husband --- Husbands --- Law --- Law and Development --- Laws --- Marriage --- Marriages --- Population and Development --- Population Policies --- Residence --- Social Development --- Social Inclusion and Institutions --- Wife --- Will --- Wives --- Woman --- Women
Book
Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants.
Accounting --- Adverse Selection --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Contract Law --- Contracts --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Effects --- Efficiency --- Equity --- Family Labor --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Incentive Problems --- Incentives --- Information --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Labor Allocation --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monitoring --- Moral Hazard --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Policies --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Production --- Productivity --- Property Rights --- Real Estate Development --- Risk --- Social Protections and Labor --- Supply --- Theory --- Urban Development --- Urban Housing
Book
Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,
Abstract | Keywords | Export | Availability | Bookmark
Loading...Choose an application
- Reference Manager
- EndNote
- RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)
In a setting where husbands wield considerable coercive power, forms of marriage should adapt to protect the interests of women and their families. The authors study the pervasive marriage custom of watta satta in rural Pakistan, a bride exchange between families coupled with a mutual threat of retaliation. They show that watta satta may be a mechanism to coordinate the actions of two sets of in-laws, each of whom wish to restrain their sons-in-law but who only have the ability to restrain their sons. The authors' empirical results support this view. The likelihood of marital inefficiency, as measured by estrangement, domestic abuse, and wife's mental health, is significantly lower in watta satta arrangements as compared with conventional marriages, but only after properly accounting for selection.
Anthropology --- Child --- Culture & Development --- Divorce --- Domestic Abuse --- Domestic Violence --- Families --- Family --- Female --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Home --- Husband --- Husbands --- Law --- Law and Development --- Laws --- Marriage --- Marriages --- Population and Development --- Population Policies --- Residence --- Social Development --- Social Inclusion and Institutions --- Wife --- Will --- Wives --- Woman --- Women
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